Following is an expanded version of an article I posted on this website earlier. The previous version has been removed. This version appeared in the May, 2008 edition of the Foreign Service Journal.
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On Oct. 1, 2007, the United States Africa Command was established as a sub-unified command, still subordinate to the European Command, which covers most of Africa. (The Central Command is responsible for U.S. military relations with the Horn, Egypt, Sudan and Kenya, while the Pacific Command covers activities in the Indian Ocean islands.) Headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, AFRICOM will become fully responsible for U.S. military relations with all 53 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa by the end of the current fiscal year (Sept. 30, 2008). The command is led by General William E. Ward, whose deputies are Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates (a Foreign Service officer) and Admiral Robert T. Moeller. The FY 2008 transition year budget is $75 million. $392 is requested for FY 2009.
The rationale for the new command is that it will improve the U.S. military focus on Africa and enhance American interagency support for the development of African military establishments. AFRICOM’s mission is to build African capacity so that African states can manage their own security issues. It is also intended to stimulate professionalization, enhance civilian control and inculcate respect for human rights.
While many African governments embrace the idea of more attention to their military needs, they are concerned about possible great-power militarization of the continent. And they are apprehensive about the perception (as much as the reality) of undermining continental neutrality enshrined in the charter of the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity). Others are generally skeptical of America’s intentions, fearing a hidden agenda of hegemony.
Even though the Bush administration has articulated a credible explanation for the evolution to the new command, many – at home and abroad - remain skeptical. Details are scarce about how AFRICOM’s civil and economic objectives will be pursued. President John Kufor of Ghana, for example, seized the occasion of President Bush’s recent stop to ask point blank about real U.S. intentions. Clearly, doubts regarding U.S. intentions, coupled with concerns arising from our military posture in Iraq and Afghanistan, have tended to excite and feed fodder to critics. They variously decry the initiative as representing the extension of a global war on Islam, a preparation to annex African oil fields, and U.S. military interference in politics, including the threat of regime change for nations that run afoul of Washington’s capricious whims. Of course, those conclusions are balderdash, to be blunt, but they do contain kernels of truth. American policy does combat terrorism and much of the global variety does have Islamic connections. We want the world’s oil supplies to be secure and we do criticize autocratic regimes, especially those like Robert Mugabe’s in Zimbabwe that egregiously abuse the rights of their people.
Reaching out to African Militaries
Shibboleths aside, it is worth examining the premise that African military establishments merit American support at all. Even though national defense is regularly cited as their primary task, African armies rarely need to repel foreign invaders. Most African conflicts – e.g., Sudan, Chad, the Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone -- arise from domestic issues. Only the unresolved Ethiopia-Eritrea border war, the recent Congolese wars and the Ethiopian presence in Somalia fit the mode of external aggression.
So instead of defense, the primary job of African armies is to protect the ruling regime by keeping the life president in power (by informal count some 15 current leaders initially came to power via military means) and to thwart threats to the status quo mounted by the opposition, democratic or otherwise. To this end, militaries or special units thereof become tribal fiefdoms loyal to the president and dedicated to his well-being.
Despite this objective, history shows that this sort of Praetorian Guard has had mixed results in protecting the incumbent. In fact many, if not most, coups were organized by those closest to the president. The list of chiefs of staff who mounted coups is lengthy: Amin, Bokassa, Kolingba, Deby, Buyoya, Bagaza, Habyarimana, Barre, Mobutu, Ironsi, Obasanjo, Babangida, Eyadema, Kountche, Bashir and more.
Perhaps recognizing this fact of political life, many presidents – including military men -- have been only reluctant supporters of the national army. This hesitancy, reinforced by the impecunity of most states and the fact of underdevelopment, has kept African military establishments in the last rank. Even so, there is great diversity across the continent. Some are a mere hodgepodge of ill-equipped, untrained thugs who are more of a threat to society than an asset (e.g., the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, Sudan). Others are a repository of political support for a regime, either because of ethnic affiliation or because of largess handed out to military leaders (Nigeria, Gabon). In some countries, army personnel are politically astute revolutionary fighters who learned their craft prior to becoming part of the ruling apparatus (Rwanda, Eritrea). And a few military establishments are impartial, professional and fairly competent, with limited objectives and responsibilities (South Africa, Botswana, Senegal).
In any case, almost all African institutions suffer from a lack of resources and equipment. Their leadership structure is often internally incoherent and subjected to political interference. Still, compared with other national institutions in most of those countries, the military is well organized and adequately funded. Few nations have the wherewithal to operate tanks or fly jet aircraft, but they regularly cough up salaries for the troops. The challenge is sorting out the regime maintenance function and the brutality that occasionally accompanies that from other defense responsibilities, and judging when and where to draw the line regarding militaries that merit support and those that don’t.
Over the years, former colonial powers like Britain, France and Belgium, as well as the U.S. and Russia during the Cold War, and now China have sought to modernize and professionalize African militaries, seeking to develop them into smaller replicas of their own establishments. In contrast to earlier years when revolutionary ideology (Tanzania, Zambia, Namibia, Zimbabwe) provided the basis for military cooperation, China today is flogging a full range of military assets, weaponry and aircraft to all buyers. At least in part, this broader approach reflects Beijing’s perception that Africa constitutes a growing market, as well as a source of sympathetic partners in the non-Western world.
Washington continues to provide training and some equipment, such as basic troop kits, communications gear and night-vision devices, but little in the way of sophisticated weapons systems. Such limited access to the African military market is unlikely to change, for our offerings are simply too complex, expensive and unsuitable for the main tasks confronting the continent’s armed forces.
So what can we do? On a case-by-case basis, we already evaluate each country’s military forces and offer the sort of help we believe realistic for its situation. This ranges from zero assistance for the egregious, abusive nondemocratic regimes of the continent to various types of individual or unit training, to communications gear, electronic equipment, transportation assets and a full range of support for peacekeeping units for more respectable nations. Such aid is predicated on a political assessment that such assistance to the military supports rather than contradicts broader U.S. policy in support of democracy, development and respect for human rights.
The nexus of two competing objectives is where the hard calls arise. For example, an African nation’s commitment to counterterrorism might entice U.S. policymakers to seek closer ties to further such activism. However, recognition that the forces in question are blatant abusers of the rights of a struggling democratic opposition ought to dampen the prospects for American support. Which side do we want to be on in such cases?
The current crises in Chad and Kenya pose policy questions that might be answered differently in a robust AFRICOM era. We have not meddled in Chad (leave it to the French!), but would we do so if we were focusing greater attention on its army? And in Kenya, except for one brief foray into Naivasha, the army has thus far stayed in the barracks – in part because it, too, is riven by tribal divisions, so any deployment might well result in intra-army violence. While we can applaud this restraint, it raises the question: What use is a national military in such a crisis? And what is the value of our investment in training it?
Both situations certainly fall under the rubric of maintaining continental security, one of AFRICOM’s stated objectives. Yet it is hard to see how any direct U.S. involvement, via our military or theirs, could be productive in resolving these crises. Although U.S. policy eschews direct military involvement in such situations, American attacks against purported terrorist elements in Somalia, for example, do raise the issue of if-you-have-the-assets how will you use them?
Thus, observers are correct in asking questions because DOD and State intend AFRICOM to be different from other combatant commands (e.g., EUCOM, CENTCOM and PACOM). It has still-undefined responsibilities and tasks beyond the purely military sphere. For example, staffing plans call for an FSO as lead deputy (Amb. Yates is already in place) and up to a hundred or more interagency personnel. If nothing else, this demonstrates a clear intent for programs that focus on humanitarian and development issues.
Some American advocates of paying more attention to Africa, particularly in the NGO community, dismiss AFRICOM as a mechanism to do that without really providing more resources. But the assumption is that once the command is in place, more resources will flow to it. Undoubtedly, they will. Pentagon cynics would add that one more four-star billet and all the accompanying support translates into more advancement opportunities within the system.
Do Something Dramatic!
U.S. spokesmen have said that the new command will be oriented toward humanitarian issues and military improvements. It will respond to catastrophes, help build competent national militaries, sustain nascent regional organizations, support economic development and political democracy. What appears to be missing in all the hoopla is an unequivocal response to Africa’s pressing security needs, which include elimination of warlords, reduction of tribal strife, achievement of internal peace and the need to live in a safer regional neighborhood. More tangible support for the continent’s armed forces, including training and some equipment, is indeed desirable, both for its own sake and to facilitate effective participation in African peacekeeping operations – to wit: Sudan, Somalia, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While this is a laudable objective, the U.S. contribution has a long time line. Meanwhile, dangerous situations fester. Why not move faster?
Three opportunities come to mind. Fortunately, the first is already under way: using the U.S. Navy to combat piracy in the Red Sea and off the Horn of Africa. A broader effort to patrol the sea lanes off West Africa in order to halt illegal oil bunkering would be similarly aimed at restoring the rule of law. Clearly, this would entail enlisting the support of littoral states.
The most dramatic initiative would be the provision of U.S. helicopters to UNAMIS, the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Sudan. The United Nations is seeking a squadron of several dozen choppers, most for lift, as well as several gunships. Efforts to find helicopters have so far come up empty, posing the risk that the whole operation will be scuttled.
Offering up such support would indeed reinforce our intent to help Africa. But howls and arguments against the idea would be loud: we cannot bleed Iraq for Sudan; the U.S. should never participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations; Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir would never accept American forces. Undoubtedly, these are legitimate issues, but if AFRICOM wants to respond to legitimate security needs in Africa, no better task awaits. And the mere willingness to fight the policy battle within the U.S. government, with the U.N. and with Sudan to implement such assistance would show solid commitment to Africa and underscore the legitimacy of the new command.
Ambassadorial Responsibility
From the State Department perspective, we need not fear AFRICOM’s advent. Not only does it have positive elements that should advance U.S. interests in various African nations, but seconding FSOs to the command will help ensure that DOD has broader thematic perspectives. However, AFRICOM does pose some issues that, if not sorted out early, might become irksome.
Existing chief-of-mission authority is adequate for AFRICOM, so long as serving and future ambassadors exercise their responsibilities pursuant to the presidential letter of authority and under National Security Decision Directive 38, and the military components follow their own chain of command. In short the ambassador has absolute authority over personnel and operations in his or her country of assignment. We should think about and treat non-resident AFRICOM personnel exactly as we considered previous command elements. To wit:
All visitors, military and civilian, will still require country clearances. All programs, whether involving JCET (exercises), IMET and ACOTA (training), FMS (sales) or TSCTP (counterterrorism), are subject to ambassadorial approval. The only exception is the forces of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, some 1,500 troops stationed at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, who currently fall under the operational control of CENTCOM (but will eventually shift to AFRICOM). In accordance with existing practice, such combat elements enjoy a separate chain of command, but their in-country, non-combat activities – drilling wells in Djibouti, for example – all remain subject to ambassadorial oversight. Because the new Africa Command does not anticipate stationing any additional combat personnel on the continent or setting up other bases, there should be no other exceptions to chief-of-mission authority.
As an aside, let me note that Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance, the program that provides training and equipment to African units scheduled for deployment as multilateral peacekeepers, will not -- at least initially -- become an AFRICOM responsibility. ACOTA (formerly known as the African Crisis Response Initiative) is America’s most successful and useful military program in Africa, one that has helped prepare contingents from Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Ghana and other countries for service in Darfur, Somalia, Liberia and Congo. ACOTA is funded via the peacekeeping account administered by the State Department, and State does not intend to relinquish control.
Where to Set up Shop?
Various soundings around the continent have shown that the time is not ripe for the establishment of a large military headquarters in Africa. The issue is apparently too emotional and too tied up in the uncertainties of what AFRICOM is all about. Logistic issues also constrain a move. When or if a relocation from Germany is approved, facilities for it will have to be built from the ground up. Only Liberia, perhaps understanding the positive economic impact of such an installation, has stepped forward to seek the emplacement of the headquarters on its soil.
Even though the headquarters will remain in Germany, AFRICOM anticipates standing up about three or four sub-headquarters. The intent is to get at least some personnel into the theater of operations. About 30 personnel on standard tours of duty would be assigned to each sub-headquarters unit. Although locales have yet to be determined, logically they would correspond to the geographic regions of Africa. Djibouti takes care of eastern Africa, so sites will be needed in the west (Ghana or Liberia are leading candidates), the south (probably Botswana) and the north (Tunisia or Morocco, although this idea has less traction in the north). While the structure will be important for the countries concerned, what is most crucial from an interagency perspective will be the interaction between the regional headquarters elements and the host embassy.
Note that such regional offices will be a new global element to be invented in Africa. Sub-commands of other combatant commands – Diego Garcia, Okinawa, Korea, etc. -- include operational forces that are exempted from chief-of-mission authority.
On the whole, we should consider such offices similar to USAID’s Regional Economic Development Services Offices: i.e., they and their personnel fall under COM authority. Thus, when they operate in a particular country, the U.S. ambassador there is in charge. And when personnel travel regionally, personnel and projects remain the purview of the ambassador of the nation being visited.
It is worth noting that both USAID and DOD already deal separately with African regional organizations, such as the Southern African Development Community or the Economic Community of West African States. For instance, what if ECOWAS wants to conduct a military exercise in Togo with U.S. input, with the planning, logistical support, etc. coming from its headquarters in Abuja? Which ambassador has authority? The answer is both, but this will require coordination on the U.S. side. Such multi-country coordination will loom even larger and become more complex as AFRICOM expands its cooperation with the African Union and its security programs around the continent.
Practical Constraints
According to Pentagon sources, each AFRICOM regional office should consist of about 30 personnel; some uniformed, some not. These staffers will need a lot of office space that is clearly not available inside any existing embassy. Thus, pending expansion of chancelleries or building annexes, facilities will have to be leased. These personnel and their families will also need substantial administrative support: housing, health care, shipping, transportation, contracting, cashiering, and educational opportunities for dependents. Virtually all these services will place an immense burden on receiving embassies. Although initially many AFRICOM personnel might be assigned on a TDY basis, except perhaps for housing, the required logistical support package is just as intimidating as for those on longer tours.
While all concerned will do their utmost to make this work, it won’t be easy. A key principle at stake is equity, keeping the playing field even so that no one gets more, better or different services at post than anyone else. The new influx of staff -- particularly military personnel who are accustomed to a global standard of support -- will challenge that approach, but adherence to that principle will be key to making AFRICOM offices and personnel part of the country team.
An augmented in-country military presence also raises thorny operational issues like communications. Initially, AFRICOM offices can utilize existing embassy networks, but they will soon want their own separate systems. How can this be accommodated? Similarly, AFRICOM will want its own security force, which will have an impact on the regional security office. Who will do the hiring? How will State and DOD practices be melded? Will there be military police alongside Marine security guard detachments? And then there is the question of weapons, an operational issue related to force protection in the wake of terrorist threats. Who in the country team can bear arms and under what circumstances?
Then we come to responsibilities for reporting, intelligence collection and analysis. Most ambassadors have existing understandings with defense attachés as to which DAO messages need clearance by the political-economic section and the front office. But a larger military element at post will necessarily intrude upon such understandings. It will be incumbent upon the ambassador and the AFRICOM chief to work out these parameters. In order to ensure consistency, written guidelines should be developed.
Striking a Balance
With the Africa Command’s advent, turf issues will intensify -- and not just in the countries hosting those personnel. Already, U.S. military resources and projects are crossing ministerial lines across the continent. While the key local client for AFRICOM remains the host-country ministry of defense, U.S. military resources already go toward projects in various civilian ministries, including water development, women’s affairs, health, interior, aviation and so forth. Undertakings include a full gamut of activities ranging from humanitarian succor and HIV/AIDS prevention to democracy promotion and public diplomacy.
Obviously, military programming risks duplication where USAID, the Centers for Disease Control, Peace Corps Volunteers and others are already engaged. That said, host governments are quick to realize where the money is, so they will increasingly focus requests on U.S. military elements.
The proposed interagency structure of AFRICOM recognizes this issue. Although the number and type of interagency billets has yet to be finalized, it is clear that the command will have a significant civilian element, including experts in economic development and complex humanitarian emergencies. Initially, AFRICOM wants several dozen FSOs for a range of political/military and economic jobs. Although assigning personnel would certainly affirm the interagency character of the new command, in light of service demands for Iraq including the elimination of jobs in Africa, it is unlikely that the Department of State can spare many personnel for such excursion tours.
Also still at stake is what AFRICOM’s non-military tasks will be. The U.S. already does a pretty competent job of economic development and humanitarian relief. What additional benefits – besides money – can AFRICOM bring to those tasks?
Washington policymakers, as well as ambassadors in the field, need to decide how much militarization of non-military assistance is wise and ensure that such undertakings are properly vetted. Such discussions will become increasingly important when (not if) AFRICOM gets more resources to play with.
In conclusion, AFRICOM is initially a reorientation of American bureaucratic responsibilities that will probably work well for us, but remain confusing to African governments. Having nothing else to distract it, the new command will undoubtedly focus on Africa and follow through on programs. This augurs well for a more consistent partnership with the continent, but how it evolves remains to be seen.
I suspect that African governments will adjust to progress and that press-stoked fears of hegemony will diminish. However, the temptation on the American side will be to try to do too much. Even a small AFRICOM looms large compared to host country military establishments. Furthermore, the command’s initial budget of $392 million will dwarf a number of national budgets. We should recognize that Africa’s absorptive capacity is limited and, as noted above, few of its leaders really want competent generals commanding capable forces.
To misquote Teddy Roosevelt, we don’t need a big stick in Africa, but we do need to tread carefully. Although Washington (as usual) will have the ultimate say, it will be up to U.S. ambassadors in the field to guide all these new boots into careful paths.
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Retired Ambassador Robert Gribbin spent many years in Africa posted to the Central African Republic, Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda. He also served on delegations to the United Nations General Assembly and the U.N. Human Rights Commission. Since retiring from the Foreign Service, he has undertaken When Actually Employed assignments to Liberia, DRC, Djibouti, Ghana, Chad, Burundi, Mauritius and Nigeria. He is the author of In the Aftermath of Genocide: The U.S. Role in Rwanda (2005).
Friday, May 2, 2008
Friday, April 18, 2008
Rwanda: Film Review - Beyond the Gates
Beyond the Gates is a film about the Rwandan genocide. It adds fictional characters to a real incident in order to create a story line that accurately portrays the horror of the genocide itself, but with emphasis on the stark moral dilemmas faced by westerners in the face of that evil.
The setting is Ecole Technique in Kigali where an elderly priest (played by John Hurt) and Christopher, an idealistic young Englishman (Hugh Dancy), are working in the weeks prior to the social cataclysm. Viewers see preparations for genocide via a slimy local councilman who makes lists of Tutsi families and checks on the small UN peacekeeping detachment housed at the school. When the troubles begin, the priest knows that hundreds of Tutsi will seek refuge behind his gates both because of the ostensible protection of the church in times of trial and on account of the real protection afforded by the peacekeepers.
The Tutsi come by the thousands as do several dozen Europeans. As the genocide unfolds beyond the gates the protagonists each venture out on errands of mercy only to discover the horror that awaits. Friendships are betrayed. Ethnic madness rules. Gangs of Interahamwe killers prance and chant and butcher. Meanwhile the issue of why the killings and why the indifference of the peacekeepers to it play out center stage. Ultimately, French troops arrive at the school, but only to evacuate the Europeans. The Belgian peacekeepers are ordered out shortly thereafter leaving the priest and teacher to their choices and Africans to their fates.
I (the reviewer) served as U.S. ambassador to Rwanda in the years just after the genocide. This film, which was shot in Rwanda and involved survivors of the Ecole Technique massacre, does accurately reflect the overall sense of doom during the execution of genocide. Yet, the story line is set up so as to highlight western shortcomings and frustrations in face of the killings rather than Rwandan ones. Identifying with the principle characters, viewers see the issues in understandable terms. Perhaps that is as it should be because we all need to reflect upon this catastrophe. Be aware that this is wrenching drama that contains some graphic scenes.
Other films about the genocide include: Ghosts of Rwanda (a documentary), Hotel Rwanda, Sometimes in April and the recently released Shake Hands with the Devil. The latter film is a cinematic treatment of General Dallaire’s (the UN Peacekeeping Force commander) book of the same name. It is a powerful drama, well acted and shot in Rwanda. It makes the case that the west – especially the UN Security Council – did not authorize actions to halt the genocide because it did not view the crisis as severe.
Note that Beyond the Gates, a 20th Century Fox film, was released eariler by the BBC as Shooting Dogs.
The setting is Ecole Technique in Kigali where an elderly priest (played by John Hurt) and Christopher, an idealistic young Englishman (Hugh Dancy), are working in the weeks prior to the social cataclysm. Viewers see preparations for genocide via a slimy local councilman who makes lists of Tutsi families and checks on the small UN peacekeeping detachment housed at the school. When the troubles begin, the priest knows that hundreds of Tutsi will seek refuge behind his gates both because of the ostensible protection of the church in times of trial and on account of the real protection afforded by the peacekeepers.
The Tutsi come by the thousands as do several dozen Europeans. As the genocide unfolds beyond the gates the protagonists each venture out on errands of mercy only to discover the horror that awaits. Friendships are betrayed. Ethnic madness rules. Gangs of Interahamwe killers prance and chant and butcher. Meanwhile the issue of why the killings and why the indifference of the peacekeepers to it play out center stage. Ultimately, French troops arrive at the school, but only to evacuate the Europeans. The Belgian peacekeepers are ordered out shortly thereafter leaving the priest and teacher to their choices and Africans to their fates.
I (the reviewer) served as U.S. ambassador to Rwanda in the years just after the genocide. This film, which was shot in Rwanda and involved survivors of the Ecole Technique massacre, does accurately reflect the overall sense of doom during the execution of genocide. Yet, the story line is set up so as to highlight western shortcomings and frustrations in face of the killings rather than Rwandan ones. Identifying with the principle characters, viewers see the issues in understandable terms. Perhaps that is as it should be because we all need to reflect upon this catastrophe. Be aware that this is wrenching drama that contains some graphic scenes.
Other films about the genocide include: Ghosts of Rwanda (a documentary), Hotel Rwanda, Sometimes in April and the recently released Shake Hands with the Devil. The latter film is a cinematic treatment of General Dallaire’s (the UN Peacekeeping Force commander) book of the same name. It is a powerful drama, well acted and shot in Rwanda. It makes the case that the west – especially the UN Security Council – did not authorize actions to halt the genocide because it did not view the crisis as severe.
Note that Beyond the Gates, a 20th Century Fox film, was released eariler by the BBC as Shooting Dogs.
Tuesday, April 1, 2008
Opinion - Kenya must seize the moment!
I applaud the recent agreement signed by President Kibaki and now new Prime Minister Raila Odinga. This start to cooperation between warring camps bodes well for return to peace within the nation and the prospects for crafting more permanent solutions to long standing problems. But first, the two principals need to decide on a cabinet. Kenya especially needs dynamic ministers who can lead and act and translate noble sounding rhetoric into reality that improves the lot of the wanainchi.
Many wounds need salve. The tribal clashes that rendered the nation are mostly over – for the time being – but underlying issues of access to land, land ownership and freedom of movement and residence must be sorted out. Also, a new government must debate reparations for victims of conflict. Security forces have to cope with roving bands of tribal militia. And if the issues of returning to normal were not tough enough, Kenya must also cope with an economy devastated by the troubles. Many businesses are defunct, the transportation sector crippled, schooling interrupted, agricultural production halved and tourism all but halted. Additionally, thousands of internally displaced people require shelter, food and water.
Resolving these myriad issues will require determination, resources and political compromise, but that is the task before the new government. Outside help is certainly available, but it is incumbent upon the collective leadership of Kenya to take the lead. History (and the Kenyan people) will judge them on the record of their achievements.
Many wounds need salve. The tribal clashes that rendered the nation are mostly over – for the time being – but underlying issues of access to land, land ownership and freedom of movement and residence must be sorted out. Also, a new government must debate reparations for victims of conflict. Security forces have to cope with roving bands of tribal militia. And if the issues of returning to normal were not tough enough, Kenya must also cope with an economy devastated by the troubles. Many businesses are defunct, the transportation sector crippled, schooling interrupted, agricultural production halved and tourism all but halted. Additionally, thousands of internally displaced people require shelter, food and water.
Resolving these myriad issues will require determination, resources and political compromise, but that is the task before the new government. Outside help is certainly available, but it is incumbent upon the collective leadership of Kenya to take the lead. History (and the Kenyan people) will judge them on the record of their achievements.
Book Review - Acts of Faith
This is a review of a novel, Acts of Faith, by Philip Caputo. It was published by Vintage Books, NY, in 2005.
This novel set in Kenya and Sudan revolves around humanitarian efforts to aid stricken people in war torn southern Sudan. That is a large topic and author Caputo strives to include something for everyone. For example, the cast of characters include a jaundiced Kenyan soccer player searching for meaning; a vivacious white settler, who out of guilt, engages in good works; cynical mercenary pilots; a dew-eyed young missionary overwhelmed with Africa; a driven evangelist who is also a sharp businessman; a romantic SPLA commander and an Africa-seasoned, wise priest. There are many others, but those are central to the various plots that swirl around.
Themes in the novel include the logistics and economics of food aid, gun running, Kenyan bureaucratic corruption, slavery in Sudan, redemption by external Christian groups, sensationalist journalism, Janjaweed raids, the awful impact of warfare upon civilian populations, love, and lust.
The setting in Lokichokio (the gritty northwestern Kenyan base for Sudanese relief operations), Nairobi, and the Nuba mountains is authentic. Obviously well researched, Caputo realistically captures the feeling of the places that he describes well. Swahili usage was minimal, but accurate.
The reader will be overwhelmed as the various threads of stories make their appearance, but eventually they do coalesce into a coherent stream. The characters too start off as stereotypical profiles, but as the story moves along they too fill out and become more realistic.
The fate of the characters and the thrust of the plot aside, underlying questions being addressed in this novel are those of the utility and/or futility of western aid in catastrophic situations. Does such aid really help? Is it manipulated for private gain? Just what is the cost of such business? Morally, what is acceptable? And how to sort out motives? Does why folks engage really matter to recipients or only to the donor? Caputo does not provide any direct answers to such questions, but he does lay issues so that readers might consider them.
In conclusion, this was quite a readable and entertaining novel, indeed even a must read for those engaged in humanitarian operations or missionary undertakings.
This novel set in Kenya and Sudan revolves around humanitarian efforts to aid stricken people in war torn southern Sudan. That is a large topic and author Caputo strives to include something for everyone. For example, the cast of characters include a jaundiced Kenyan soccer player searching for meaning; a vivacious white settler, who out of guilt, engages in good works; cynical mercenary pilots; a dew-eyed young missionary overwhelmed with Africa; a driven evangelist who is also a sharp businessman; a romantic SPLA commander and an Africa-seasoned, wise priest. There are many others, but those are central to the various plots that swirl around.
Themes in the novel include the logistics and economics of food aid, gun running, Kenyan bureaucratic corruption, slavery in Sudan, redemption by external Christian groups, sensationalist journalism, Janjaweed raids, the awful impact of warfare upon civilian populations, love, and lust.
The setting in Lokichokio (the gritty northwestern Kenyan base for Sudanese relief operations), Nairobi, and the Nuba mountains is authentic. Obviously well researched, Caputo realistically captures the feeling of the places that he describes well. Swahili usage was minimal, but accurate.
The reader will be overwhelmed as the various threads of stories make their appearance, but eventually they do coalesce into a coherent stream. The characters too start off as stereotypical profiles, but as the story moves along they too fill out and become more realistic.
The fate of the characters and the thrust of the plot aside, underlying questions being addressed in this novel are those of the utility and/or futility of western aid in catastrophic situations. Does such aid really help? Is it manipulated for private gain? Just what is the cost of such business? Morally, what is acceptable? And how to sort out motives? Does why folks engage really matter to recipients or only to the donor? Caputo does not provide any direct answers to such questions, but he does lay issues so that readers might consider them.
In conclusion, this was quite a readable and entertaining novel, indeed even a must read for those engaged in humanitarian operations or missionary undertakings.
Saturday, January 26, 2008
Concern for Kenya
Following is an appeal for calm that I wrote as Vice President of the Friends of Kenya. It is also posted on the FOK web site (www.friendsofkenya.org).
Statement of Concern
The board of Friends of Kenya and, as we well know, many members of our organization have followed events in Kenya over the past month with a great sense of sadness, concern and apprehension. We send our condolences to the families who have lost loved ones and our pole to those who have been displaced. We hope that peace will be restored soon in Kenya
As a non-political organization, FOK has always refrained from expressing political views. We will continue to adhere to that policy and thus cannot support either President Kibaki or challenger Odinga.
However, we can and do take a stand in support of the Kenyan people. We support all Kenyan people at this time of crisis. We abhor ethnic enmity and tribal violence. We adamantly stand for truth and justice and call for the cessation of the senseless hostility that divides Kenyans from each other. We endorse the efforts of UN and African mediators to craft, along with Kenyan leaders from both sides, resolution to the crisis.
The toll in Kenya in lives, homes, jobs and prospects is already much too high. We deplore the destruction of neighborhoods and especially of the social comity that enabled Kenyans to mix together without rancor in pursuit of national development. It should be of highest priority to regain that lost ground, that togetherness, that sense of nationhood, that sense of being Kenyan. Success in pursuit of this goal will require a workable political settlement between the warring factions which is something that only they can author. The world insists that they achieve this. But beyond that Kenyans themselves will have to set aside suspicions and fears. Each person will have to take the brave steps to instill peace and forgiveness in his or her heart and to extend that peace to fellow citizens.
Friends of Kenya as an organization composed of individuals who harbor a great respect for Kenya want Kenyans to know of our concern for them and their nation at this time of crisis. We pray for peace and for reconciliation so that the nation that we all love so fondly might regain the vibrancy and the tolerance that served so well for generations.
Statement of Concern
The board of Friends of Kenya and, as we well know, many members of our organization have followed events in Kenya over the past month with a great sense of sadness, concern and apprehension. We send our condolences to the families who have lost loved ones and our pole to those who have been displaced. We hope that peace will be restored soon in Kenya
As a non-political organization, FOK has always refrained from expressing political views. We will continue to adhere to that policy and thus cannot support either President Kibaki or challenger Odinga.
However, we can and do take a stand in support of the Kenyan people. We support all Kenyan people at this time of crisis. We abhor ethnic enmity and tribal violence. We adamantly stand for truth and justice and call for the cessation of the senseless hostility that divides Kenyans from each other. We endorse the efforts of UN and African mediators to craft, along with Kenyan leaders from both sides, resolution to the crisis.
The toll in Kenya in lives, homes, jobs and prospects is already much too high. We deplore the destruction of neighborhoods and especially of the social comity that enabled Kenyans to mix together without rancor in pursuit of national development. It should be of highest priority to regain that lost ground, that togetherness, that sense of nationhood, that sense of being Kenyan. Success in pursuit of this goal will require a workable political settlement between the warring factions which is something that only they can author. The world insists that they achieve this. But beyond that Kenyans themselves will have to set aside suspicions and fears. Each person will have to take the brave steps to instill peace and forgiveness in his or her heart and to extend that peace to fellow citizens.
Friends of Kenya as an organization composed of individuals who harbor a great respect for Kenya want Kenyans to know of our concern for them and their nation at this time of crisis. We pray for peace and for reconciliation so that the nation that we all love so fondly might regain the vibrancy and the tolerance that served so well for generations.
Wednesday, January 9, 2008
Tribalism in Kenya
Understanding Tribalism in Kenya
Recent rioting, score settling, ethnic cleansing and other tribally motivated violence in Kenya was sparked in the aftermath of the December 27, 2007 presidential election when incumbent president Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, flat out stole the election. Opponent Raila Odinga, a Luo, had led in all polls and by early counts seemed to be almost a million votes ahead as tallies came in. When that reality struck, Kibaki and his “Kikuyu mafia” inner circle simply had the results changed to assure a second term. They were probably prepared to do this all along and probably correctly assessed they could get away with it. So far, they have succeeded, but not without turmoil.
It is not genocide
First, despite the horrific video clips of mobs and police running amuck, it is important to understand that what is happening in Kenya is not genocide. The situation is not analogous to what transpired in Rwanda or to what is ongoing in Darfur. In Kenya there is no government policy of extermination of an ethnic group. There are no government backed armed militias. There is no official propaganda machine egging murder on. In short, tribal violence in Kenya is not genocide; nor have killings occurred on a truly massive scale.
It is also important to point out that tribalism in Kenya is not atavistic. It does not arise from ancient hatreds or warfare from cultures clashing over the eons. In fact, the two opposing groups, the Luo of western Kenya from the shores of Lake Victoria and the Kikuyu from central Kenya surrounding Mt. Kenya, had little contact with one another until the 20th century. Accordingly, Kenya’s tribalism is a relatively new phenomenon. It is a product of modern times arising from colonialism, urbanization, the population explosion and independent Kenya’s political culture. Yet, however induced, the tension and the hatred are very real and quite damaging.
Historically apart
Traditionally in Kenya, tribes lived in their own distinct areas with their own cultures, i.e. language, customs, myths of origin, etc. People interacted from time to time with neighboring tribes with some sporatic clashing over cattle or land, but given the space available in lightly populated east Africa, what long term animosities that there were grew up between the nomadic cattle keepers – the Masai – and their sedentary neighbors – the Kikuyu and Kamba. The Luo and Kikuyu were separated by miles of inhospitable Masai and Nandi land. With the coming of Europeans, being Kenya’s largest groups as well as chiefly farmers, the Luo and the Kikuyu accepted outside ways, especially Christianity and education (the two often went hand-in-hand). Individuals from these tribes were at the forefront of early politics. Many moved from home areas to work on European farms or to the towns and cities. Thus the ethnic mix of present day Kenya began.
British rule in the colony was founded on the principle of divide and conquer. British administrators accentuated differences and sought to play groups off against each other. So from the beginning of multi-tribal life, seeds of discontent were sewn. Mau Mau compounded such distinctions when the British recruited Luo and other tribesmen into “loyalist” forces to combat Kikuyu nationalism. Negative tribal stereotypes became embedded in popular belief. Lazy, uncircumcised, fish-eating Luos contrasted with clever, cheating, arrogant Kikuyus. And so forth.
With the achievement of independence in 1963, the spoils of government accrued to the victors. First President Jomo Kenyatta rode multi-tribal support to office, but his regime reverted both to the reality and to the perception of favoritism towards the Kikuyu. This manifested itself in greater government expenditures for social infrastructure in Kikuyu areas, corruption benefits to insiders, privileged access to governmental and parastatal jobs. Such favoritism for one group was coupled with blatant discrimination against the other, including intimidation of opponents and even assassinations. Politics since has essentially pitted Kikuyu against Luos, with each side attempting to attract other tribal groups to its banners. This political struggle continued even while Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin, was president. Even though Kalenjins emerged as new contenders in the graft game, divide and rule tribalism remained the basis for politics wherein Luo and Kikuyu leaders vied for prominence either inside Moi’s camp or in opposition to him.
During the last half of the last century as Kenya’s economy grew and its population expanded, there was more movement of people, especially Kikuyu tribesmen into Rift Valley Province in search of land at the expense of Masai and Kalenjin groups. Also, Kikuyus were becoming Kenya’s small traders and as such establishing themselves in cities, towns and villages throughout the country. As is true with Jews and Koreans in American ghettos, Kikuyu traders were resented by the local population that viewed them as exploitative. Such resentment was reinforced by national politics when patronage jobs, contracts, secondary and university school slots, etc. went to Kikuyus at the expense of other tribes. Consequently, Kikuyu economic success (humble as it might be) was seen as due to unfair factors. Thus, the ethnic pot boiled over onto both national and local fires.
Passions enflamed
Even though Luos and Kikuyus reluctantly joined forces to oust President Moi in 2002, the coalition between Kibaki and Odinga quickly dissolved, essentially because Kibaki reneged on the power sharing terms. It was back to winner take all, divide and rule. In 2007 the election was more clearly cast as tribal, Kikuyu and affiliates versus Luo and allies. Election issues of change, economic and social policies got subsumed into tribalism. It was time, Odinga supporters argued, to rotate the presidency; time to try to improve a system that was not performing. This theme struck a chord among voters who rallied to Raila’s banner. Entrenched Kikuyu interests in the presidency, in the administration, in the courts, in the military and in the private sector opposed dissolution of the status quo. So far, they have shown the power to prevail.
The outburst of violence in the wake of the stolen election has to be seen as the eruption of frustrations due to that egregious act; the arrogance of which underscored the stereotypical conviction of Kikuyu pride. The wave of anti-Kikuyu emotion expressed the pain of democracy usurped. Sadly, Kikuyu people became easy targets, blamed as a group for the actions of the Kibaki clique. Rioting also expresses itself in anti-government actions, challenges to the police and the disruption of civil order. As in any such mob scene, those engaged in violence while espousing political motives, quickly moved to acts of personal vengeance, destruction, looting and crime. Sadly, as elsewhere in Africa, Kenya has an abundance of unemployed bored young men who are willing participants in violence. Once they have the taste for this odd sort of adventure, it is difficult to restrain them. Now, it will be hard to avoid the emergence of rival tribal militias.
What can be done?
I fear the social fabric of Kenya has been irreparably torn. The clock cannot be turned back. Ethnic cleansing has occurred. Kikuyu have been driven out of some areas, Luos and Luhyas from others. Loss of relatives, friends, livelihoods, homes and opportunities will only entrench hatred in the hearts of victims. Slowly, of course, life will return to more peaceful patterns, but there will be a consolidation of tribal enclaves, greater separatism and sensitivity to tribal slights. Rioters will fade away and/or be beaten into submission by the police. A grievous price will have been paid, most perniciously in terms of people’s faith in each other, but also in terms of the economic system and in politics. The venom of tribalism will poison the society for years to come.
Both Kenyans and outside friends, including the U.S., seek modalities to defuse the immediate crisis. The first espoused option is to encourage the formation of a government of national unity including both Kibaki and Odinga. Essentially this asks the winner Odinga to be magnanimous in victory and to concede defeat to the man who cheated him out of his win. Second is to re-do the election. Neither looks especially promising. If there is no progress of this sort, donors and friends of Kenya will likely keep the government at arm’s length. This will have consequences in terms of bilateral relations, aid budgets and Kenya's prestige in the international community. Shunning Kenya will undoubtedly impact adversely on tourism. Kibaki’s team, however, is probably prepared to sit tight, weather the storm, grant a concession here or there, but otherwise to wield power as before. However, none of the possible resolutions or next moves can diminish the fact that tribalism is loose in the land and that Kenyans are worse off for it.
Recent rioting, score settling, ethnic cleansing and other tribally motivated violence in Kenya was sparked in the aftermath of the December 27, 2007 presidential election when incumbent president Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, flat out stole the election. Opponent Raila Odinga, a Luo, had led in all polls and by early counts seemed to be almost a million votes ahead as tallies came in. When that reality struck, Kibaki and his “Kikuyu mafia” inner circle simply had the results changed to assure a second term. They were probably prepared to do this all along and probably correctly assessed they could get away with it. So far, they have succeeded, but not without turmoil.
It is not genocide
First, despite the horrific video clips of mobs and police running amuck, it is important to understand that what is happening in Kenya is not genocide. The situation is not analogous to what transpired in Rwanda or to what is ongoing in Darfur. In Kenya there is no government policy of extermination of an ethnic group. There are no government backed armed militias. There is no official propaganda machine egging murder on. In short, tribal violence in Kenya is not genocide; nor have killings occurred on a truly massive scale.
It is also important to point out that tribalism in Kenya is not atavistic. It does not arise from ancient hatreds or warfare from cultures clashing over the eons. In fact, the two opposing groups, the Luo of western Kenya from the shores of Lake Victoria and the Kikuyu from central Kenya surrounding Mt. Kenya, had little contact with one another until the 20th century. Accordingly, Kenya’s tribalism is a relatively new phenomenon. It is a product of modern times arising from colonialism, urbanization, the population explosion and independent Kenya’s political culture. Yet, however induced, the tension and the hatred are very real and quite damaging.
Historically apart
Traditionally in Kenya, tribes lived in their own distinct areas with their own cultures, i.e. language, customs, myths of origin, etc. People interacted from time to time with neighboring tribes with some sporatic clashing over cattle or land, but given the space available in lightly populated east Africa, what long term animosities that there were grew up between the nomadic cattle keepers – the Masai – and their sedentary neighbors – the Kikuyu and Kamba. The Luo and Kikuyu were separated by miles of inhospitable Masai and Nandi land. With the coming of Europeans, being Kenya’s largest groups as well as chiefly farmers, the Luo and the Kikuyu accepted outside ways, especially Christianity and education (the two often went hand-in-hand). Individuals from these tribes were at the forefront of early politics. Many moved from home areas to work on European farms or to the towns and cities. Thus the ethnic mix of present day Kenya began.
British rule in the colony was founded on the principle of divide and conquer. British administrators accentuated differences and sought to play groups off against each other. So from the beginning of multi-tribal life, seeds of discontent were sewn. Mau Mau compounded such distinctions when the British recruited Luo and other tribesmen into “loyalist” forces to combat Kikuyu nationalism. Negative tribal stereotypes became embedded in popular belief. Lazy, uncircumcised, fish-eating Luos contrasted with clever, cheating, arrogant Kikuyus. And so forth.
With the achievement of independence in 1963, the spoils of government accrued to the victors. First President Jomo Kenyatta rode multi-tribal support to office, but his regime reverted both to the reality and to the perception of favoritism towards the Kikuyu. This manifested itself in greater government expenditures for social infrastructure in Kikuyu areas, corruption benefits to insiders, privileged access to governmental and parastatal jobs. Such favoritism for one group was coupled with blatant discrimination against the other, including intimidation of opponents and even assassinations. Politics since has essentially pitted Kikuyu against Luos, with each side attempting to attract other tribal groups to its banners. This political struggle continued even while Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin, was president. Even though Kalenjins emerged as new contenders in the graft game, divide and rule tribalism remained the basis for politics wherein Luo and Kikuyu leaders vied for prominence either inside Moi’s camp or in opposition to him.
During the last half of the last century as Kenya’s economy grew and its population expanded, there was more movement of people, especially Kikuyu tribesmen into Rift Valley Province in search of land at the expense of Masai and Kalenjin groups. Also, Kikuyus were becoming Kenya’s small traders and as such establishing themselves in cities, towns and villages throughout the country. As is true with Jews and Koreans in American ghettos, Kikuyu traders were resented by the local population that viewed them as exploitative. Such resentment was reinforced by national politics when patronage jobs, contracts, secondary and university school slots, etc. went to Kikuyus at the expense of other tribes. Consequently, Kikuyu economic success (humble as it might be) was seen as due to unfair factors. Thus, the ethnic pot boiled over onto both national and local fires.
Passions enflamed
Even though Luos and Kikuyus reluctantly joined forces to oust President Moi in 2002, the coalition between Kibaki and Odinga quickly dissolved, essentially because Kibaki reneged on the power sharing terms. It was back to winner take all, divide and rule. In 2007 the election was more clearly cast as tribal, Kikuyu and affiliates versus Luo and allies. Election issues of change, economic and social policies got subsumed into tribalism. It was time, Odinga supporters argued, to rotate the presidency; time to try to improve a system that was not performing. This theme struck a chord among voters who rallied to Raila’s banner. Entrenched Kikuyu interests in the presidency, in the administration, in the courts, in the military and in the private sector opposed dissolution of the status quo. So far, they have shown the power to prevail.
The outburst of violence in the wake of the stolen election has to be seen as the eruption of frustrations due to that egregious act; the arrogance of which underscored the stereotypical conviction of Kikuyu pride. The wave of anti-Kikuyu emotion expressed the pain of democracy usurped. Sadly, Kikuyu people became easy targets, blamed as a group for the actions of the Kibaki clique. Rioting also expresses itself in anti-government actions, challenges to the police and the disruption of civil order. As in any such mob scene, those engaged in violence while espousing political motives, quickly moved to acts of personal vengeance, destruction, looting and crime. Sadly, as elsewhere in Africa, Kenya has an abundance of unemployed bored young men who are willing participants in violence. Once they have the taste for this odd sort of adventure, it is difficult to restrain them. Now, it will be hard to avoid the emergence of rival tribal militias.
What can be done?
I fear the social fabric of Kenya has been irreparably torn. The clock cannot be turned back. Ethnic cleansing has occurred. Kikuyu have been driven out of some areas, Luos and Luhyas from others. Loss of relatives, friends, livelihoods, homes and opportunities will only entrench hatred in the hearts of victims. Slowly, of course, life will return to more peaceful patterns, but there will be a consolidation of tribal enclaves, greater separatism and sensitivity to tribal slights. Rioters will fade away and/or be beaten into submission by the police. A grievous price will have been paid, most perniciously in terms of people’s faith in each other, but also in terms of the economic system and in politics. The venom of tribalism will poison the society for years to come.
Both Kenyans and outside friends, including the U.S., seek modalities to defuse the immediate crisis. The first espoused option is to encourage the formation of a government of national unity including both Kibaki and Odinga. Essentially this asks the winner Odinga to be magnanimous in victory and to concede defeat to the man who cheated him out of his win. Second is to re-do the election. Neither looks especially promising. If there is no progress of this sort, donors and friends of Kenya will likely keep the government at arm’s length. This will have consequences in terms of bilateral relations, aid budgets and Kenya's prestige in the international community. Shunning Kenya will undoubtedly impact adversely on tourism. Kibaki’s team, however, is probably prepared to sit tight, weather the storm, grant a concession here or there, but otherwise to wield power as before. However, none of the possible resolutions or next moves can diminish the fact that tribalism is loose in the land and that Kenyans are worse off for it.
Thursday, December 6, 2007
Djibouti - I remember a Gift
In 1986 I was making a tour of U.S. embassies in eastern Africa. I was in Djibouti, a small desert country at the southern mouth of the Red Sea. Neighboring Ethiopia and Somalia, then at relative peace, had been warring for years. As a result many thousands of ethnic Somali tribesmen from the Ogaden Region of Ethiopia had sought refuge in Djibouti. They were confined to United Nations run camps located in the arid hinterland of one of the most desolate nations in Africa. I visited one of the camps, which grouped several thousand refugees who had lived there for months; essentially on a moonscape.
This refugee camp was a bleak and seemingly hopeless place. Yet, the elders of the camp committee greeted me graciously and guided me on a tour of their squalid domain. Green plastic sheeting provided cover from the sun. Bags of U.S. donated maize and tins of vegetable oil were stacked in the food distribution warehouse. A one-tent school was operating, as was a small clinic. Flies buzzed incessantly. However, the camp committee was most anxious that I see their newly acquired well, water pump and garden.
We walked up a rock-strewn ravine past the cemetery where several new graves provided mute testimony to the ravages of disease and malnutrition. Beyond, nestled in slope of the valley in the region where there was not a blade of vegetation visible for miles, was a small patch of green. The elders showed me how boys carried water from the new well to the plots where they had managed to coax several scraggly tomato plants and other vegetables from the hard earth. The chief pointed with pride to the first water melon, about the size of a small soccer ball. He then had it picked. He presented it to me with great ceremony and thanks for America’s concern and assistance. I was overwhelmed. The camp’s children were desperate for this sort of nourishment, yet it was given unhesitating to a stranger – to someone who obviously had no need for it. Yet, I had to accept. This was a gift from the heart. I managed to utter thanks and a few words of encouragement. We then shared the bits of melon.
In the years since, I have always been struck how people with so little and with such great needs could give so easily. Yet we with so much, find it hard to give a little.
This refugee camp was a bleak and seemingly hopeless place. Yet, the elders of the camp committee greeted me graciously and guided me on a tour of their squalid domain. Green plastic sheeting provided cover from the sun. Bags of U.S. donated maize and tins of vegetable oil were stacked in the food distribution warehouse. A one-tent school was operating, as was a small clinic. Flies buzzed incessantly. However, the camp committee was most anxious that I see their newly acquired well, water pump and garden.
We walked up a rock-strewn ravine past the cemetery where several new graves provided mute testimony to the ravages of disease and malnutrition. Beyond, nestled in slope of the valley in the region where there was not a blade of vegetation visible for miles, was a small patch of green. The elders showed me how boys carried water from the new well to the plots where they had managed to coax several scraggly tomato plants and other vegetables from the hard earth. The chief pointed with pride to the first water melon, about the size of a small soccer ball. He then had it picked. He presented it to me with great ceremony and thanks for America’s concern and assistance. I was overwhelmed. The camp’s children were desperate for this sort of nourishment, yet it was given unhesitating to a stranger – to someone who obviously had no need for it. Yet, I had to accept. This was a gift from the heart. I managed to utter thanks and a few words of encouragement. We then shared the bits of melon.
In the years since, I have always been struck how people with so little and with such great needs could give so easily. Yet we with so much, find it hard to give a little.
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