It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower

A review of a book by Michela Wrong. Published by Harper, NY 2009.

If you only read one book about Kenya this year; this should be it. Author Michela Wrong has written the definitive exposé on how Kenya’s political elite have skewed their country’s political, economic and social system via tribalism and corruption so that it operates to their benefit, but to the detriment of the nation and the wanaichi. To flesh out this tale of greed, Wrong uses the saga of John Githongo, a respected journalist and NGO operative, who – because of his respectable credentials - was recruited into becoming Kenya’s anti-corruption czar following the election of Mwai Kibaki in 2002. Imbued with a zealous sense of purpose Githongo strove to cleanse the Augean stable mess left by the previous Moi and even Kenyatta administrations. He found, however, that no matter how noble the rhetoric, embedded practices were impervious to reform. Instead of correcting matters, the new cadre close to President Kibaki – including, as Githongo reluctantly concluded, the president himself– persisted in clever organized looting of the state. The justification for this was tribal, after years of exile while Moi reigned, it was again time for the Kikuyus “to eat.”

Even while following the story of one man’s enthusiasm and disillusionment, the author carefully dissects the Kenya polity. She notes, “The various forms of graft cannot be separated from the people’s vision of existence as a merciless contest, in which only ethnic preference offers hope of survival.” This leads to a comprehensive discussion of tribalism in particular how it is not an atavistic force arising from centuries of tribal struggle, but rather a manifestation of modernization. Colonialism, education, Christianity, urbanization, the cash economy – in fact all the elements of recent times brought Kenya’s various tribes into face-to-face competition. Whoever controlled power and the apparatus of the state were able to reward their “community” at the expense of everyone else. Thus common identity - rather than merit - became (and still is) the means of personal advancement. Up to a point, of course, looking after kith and kin is not pernicious, but Kenyans have never drawn a good line. Helping your cousins is one thing, but expanding beyond that to blatant theft coupled with denigration and stereotyping of others on account of their tribe has led to inimical politics, which have resulted in repeated rounds of tribal violence – with perhaps more to come.

Ms. Wrong made the point that urbanization in many ways de-tribalized Kenyans. Ethnic customs, language, etc. all succumbed to the polyglot mix of the cities, broader education and the impact of western culture. Kids, for example, did not speak tribal mother tongues or English or Swahili, but created “Sheng” for common communication. Identities were being forged more as “poor” or “affluent” rather than Luo or Kikuyu. Unfortunately, those evolutions were swept away in the political violence of 2007 where tribe became the sole criterion. In the aftermath of that violence, it is doubtful if Kenyans can regain the social cohesion that they previously enjoyed.

Some of the worst manifestations of tribalism and unbridled presidential power have been the scandals of Goldberg (under Moi) and Anglo Leasing (under Kibaki), in which hundreds of millions of dollars were blithely stolen from government coffers by those charged to manage resources properly for the people, i.e. the office of the president, the chief of the civil service, members of government and the judiciary. It was this latter scandal that Githongo uncovered. Most distressing for him was the fact that people he knew and trusted; lied, schemed and connived to cover up their shenanigans. When finally confronted with facts (Githongo secretly recorded conversations and ran a network of informers), they plead that it was all for the benefit of the Kikuyu “community,” in effect, it was their turn to eat. Indeed, something was very rotten in Kenya. Githongo fled for fear of his life.

The international donor community did not escape Wrong’s righteousness. The World Bank was singled out for marked failure to link new lending to reform, thus convincing Kenyans leaders that there were no real consequences for even spectacular corruption. Wrong found one hero in British High Commissioner (ambassador) Edward Clay who argued forcefully in public, and against the policy of his own government, that donors ought to hold Kenya accountable for proper management of all its resources.

Ultimately, Githongo’s story just sort of wound down, with no clear cut victory for the good guys. But the impact of the book did not stop there. Although part of the book has been serialized in the Nation, it is not available for purchase in Kenya. Booksellers apparently fear the wrath of the named. Even so, It’s Our Turn to Eat is a hot commodity. Copies are being imported privately, even apparently by USAID. Githongo’s recordings are available on the web where many Kenyans are listening. Ms. Wrong recently told a Washington audience that she had not sensationalized events, but reported even handedly. While she agreed that Githongo might better have told his own story, he was not ready when she was. He cooperated fully. Finally, as is mentioned in the book, Githongo’s daring set an example for other watchdogs and has certainly raised the bar for public scrutiny of elected officials. Evidently, thieves are more careful now, but the underlying structure of Kenyan politics which bred the system of tribal patronage and corruption has not changed. The struggle for seekers of change, fairness, truth and accountability has not ended.

Reviewed by Robert Gribbin, July 2009

Prime Minister Raila Odinga in Washington

I attended this talk and wrote the following report.

The Honorable Raila Odinga, Prime Minister of Kenya, spoke at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington on June 17 on the topic of “Kenya: A Way Forward.” The Prime Minister thanked the U.S. and high ranking officials for their support during Kenya’s recent difficulties. He commended foreign partners led by former UN Secretary General Anan and retired President Mkapa from Tanzania for helping to achieve internal peace. He noted that the transition government was now 60 days old. He admitted that the process of establishing the “grand coalition” had required soul searching, sacrifice and compromise, but that the Orange Democratic Movement was determined to make it work. He later added that he and President Kibaki have a viable partnership.

Reflecting on post election violence, Odinga said that Kenya “had lived a lie” in thinking it was immune from such disturbances. It was not an island of peace, but its façade had hidden disparities, inequalities and anger. Some issues dated from colonial times, others came later; all should have been addressed earlier. However, now was the time. A first step would be a new constitution. He also pledged investigations into election irregularities and human rights violations. He supported the creation of a truth, justice and reconciliation process.

The Prime Minister noted that Kenya now faces enormous economic difficulties. The chaos stalled the economy and the rains have been poor. Growth has tumbled. The new cabinet – bloated he said by necessity – will work through committees to redress the nation’s ills. Reviving the economy is a major task. Kenya will count on its friends and outside investors to help.

During his talk Odinga also strongly criticized President Mugabe of Zimbabwe saying that elections there were a “sham” and an “embarrassment” to the continent. He called on African leaders, especially President Mbeki to step up and help resolve the crisis.

In answering a question about how to restore the social fabric, the Prime Minister said that Kenya would draw on the experience of others such as South Africa to help salve wounds. Proposals for a truth and reconciliation commission were being studied. Those persons involved in mob violence would face no sanctions, but perpetrators of crimes would be prosecuted. Abuses by security forces would be investigated. Issues of compensation for victims have not been decided. Odinga noted that in the aftermath of violence, Kenyans themselves discovered their interdependence. Matatus needed passengers, just as passengers needed matatus; similarly for shops and shoppers, farmers and markets. He implied that these interconnections boded well for reestablishment of societal trust.

The Prime Minister acknowledged that land issues remain troublesome. He said that many internally displaced persons - not just Kikuyus, but Luos too - had long been settled outside of their traditional homelands. Generations later these folk have little knowledge of where their ancestors came from, so they have no “homes” to return to. He stated that land reform would be a priority and opined that the breaking up of large European farms into small plots that were increasingly sub-divided had not served the nation well. He suggested that agricultural advantages of scale could be achieved and better services provided to citizens if farms were managed cooperatively.

Comment: Prime Minister Odinga made an impressive presentation to the effect that Kenya is on the way back and on a thoughtful track. Clearly, he knows the issues and appears determined to treat them straight forwardly. Whether or not the governing coalition will permit this to occur, remains to be seen. That notwithstanding, Odinga’s visit to Washington and contacts with policy makers in the administration, the Congress and the World Bank was designed to raise Kenya’s (and Odinga’s) image and to assure interlocutors that serious efforts – that merit American support – are underway. Without doubt, that message is being heard.

Opinion - Kenya must seize the moment!

I applaud the recent agreement signed by President Kibaki and now new Prime Minister Raila Odinga. This start to cooperation between warring camps bodes well for return to peace within the nation and the prospects for crafting more permanent solutions to long standing problems. But first, the two principals need to decide on a cabinet. Kenya especially needs dynamic ministers who can lead and act and translate noble sounding rhetoric into reality that improves the lot of the wanainchi.

Many wounds need salve. The tribal clashes that rendered the nation are mostly over – for the time being – but underlying issues of access to land, land ownership and freedom of movement and residence must be sorted out. Also, a new government must debate reparations for victims of conflict. Security forces have to cope with roving bands of tribal militia. And if the issues of returning to normal were not tough enough, Kenya must also cope with an economy devastated by the troubles. Many businesses are defunct, the transportation sector crippled, schooling interrupted, agricultural production halved and tourism all but halted. Additionally, thousands of internally displaced people require shelter, food and water.

Resolving these myriad issues will require determination, resources and political compromise, but that is the task before the new government. Outside help is certainly available, but it is incumbent upon the collective leadership of Kenya to take the lead. History (and the Kenyan people) will judge them on the record of their achievements.

Concern for Kenya

Following is an appeal for calm that I wrote as Vice President of the Friends of Kenya. It is also posted on the FOK web site (www.friendsofkenya.org).

Statement of Concern

The board of Friends of Kenya and, as we well know, many members of our organization have followed events in Kenya over the past month with a great sense of sadness, concern and apprehension. We send our condolences to the families who have lost loved ones and our pole to those who have been displaced. We hope that peace will be restored soon in Kenya

As a non-political organization, FOK has always refrained from expressing political views. We will continue to adhere to that policy and thus cannot support either President Kibaki or challenger Odinga.

However, we can and do take a stand in support of the Kenyan people. We support all Kenyan people at this time of crisis. We abhor ethnic enmity and tribal violence. We adamantly stand for truth and justice and call for the cessation of the senseless hostility that divides Kenyans from each other. We endorse the efforts of UN and African mediators to craft, along with Kenyan leaders from both sides, resolution to the crisis.

The toll in Kenya in lives, homes, jobs and prospects is already much too high. We deplore the destruction of neighborhoods and especially of the social comity that enabled Kenyans to mix together without rancor in pursuit of national development. It should be of highest priority to regain that lost ground, that togetherness, that sense of nationhood, that sense of being Kenyan. Success in pursuit of this goal will require a workable political settlement between the warring factions which is something that only they can author. The world insists that they achieve this. But beyond that Kenyans themselves will have to set aside suspicions and fears. Each person will have to take the brave steps to instill peace and forgiveness in his or her heart and to extend that peace to fellow citizens.

Friends of Kenya as an organization composed of individuals who harbor a great respect for Kenya want Kenyans to know of our concern for them and their nation at this time of crisis. We pray for peace and for reconciliation so that the nation that we all love so fondly might regain the vibrancy and the tolerance that served so well for generations.

Tribalism in Kenya

Understanding Tribalism in Kenya

Recent rioting, score settling, ethnic cleansing and other tribally motivated violence in Kenya was sparked in the aftermath of the December 27, 2007 presidential election when incumbent president Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, flat out stole the election. Opponent Raila Odinga, a Luo, had led in all polls and by early counts seemed to be almost a million votes ahead as tallies came in. When that reality struck, Kibaki and his “Kikuyu mafia” inner circle simply had the results changed to assure a second term. They were probably prepared to do this all along and probably correctly assessed they could get away with it. So far, they have succeeded, but not without turmoil.

It is not genocide

First, despite the horrific video clips of mobs and police running amuck, it is important to understand that what is happening in Kenya is not genocide. The situation is not analogous to what transpired in Rwanda or to what is ongoing in Darfur. In Kenya there is no government policy of extermination of an ethnic group. There are no government backed armed militias. There is no official propaganda machine egging murder on. In short, tribal violence in Kenya is not genocide; nor have killings occurred on a truly massive scale.

It is also important to point out that tribalism in Kenya is not atavistic. It does not arise from ancient hatreds or warfare from cultures clashing over the eons. In fact, the two opposing groups, the Luo of western Kenya from the shores of Lake Victoria and the Kikuyu from central Kenya surrounding Mt. Kenya, had little contact with one another until the 20th century. Accordingly, Kenya’s tribalism is a relatively new phenomenon. It is a product of modern times arising from colonialism, urbanization, the population explosion and independent Kenya’s political culture. Yet, however induced, the tension and the hatred are very real and quite damaging.

Historically apart

Traditionally in Kenya, tribes lived in their own distinct areas with their own cultures, i.e. language, customs, myths of origin, etc. People interacted from time to time with neighboring tribes with some sporatic clashing over cattle or land, but given the space available in lightly populated east Africa, what long term animosities that there were grew up between the nomadic cattle keepers – the Masai – and their sedentary neighbors – the Kikuyu and Kamba. The Luo and Kikuyu were separated by miles of inhospitable Masai and Nandi land. With the coming of Europeans, being Kenya’s largest groups as well as chiefly farmers, the Luo and the Kikuyu accepted outside ways, especially Christianity and education (the two often went hand-in-hand). Individuals from these tribes were at the forefront of early politics. Many moved from home areas to work on European farms or to the towns and cities. Thus the ethnic mix of present day Kenya began.

British rule in the colony was founded on the principle of divide and conquer. British administrators accentuated differences and sought to play groups off against each other. So from the beginning of multi-tribal life, seeds of discontent were sewn. Mau Mau compounded such distinctions when the British recruited Luo and other tribesmen into “loyalist” forces to combat Kikuyu nationalism. Negative tribal stereotypes became embedded in popular belief. Lazy, uncircumcised, fish-eating Luos contrasted with clever, cheating, arrogant Kikuyus. And so forth.

With the achievement of independence in 1963, the spoils of government accrued to the victors. First President Jomo Kenyatta rode multi-tribal support to office, but his regime reverted both to the reality and to the perception of favoritism towards the Kikuyu. This manifested itself in greater government expenditures for social infrastructure in Kikuyu areas, corruption benefits to insiders, privileged access to governmental and parastatal jobs. Such favoritism for one group was coupled with blatant discrimination against the other, including intimidation of opponents and even assassinations. Politics since has essentially pitted Kikuyu against Luos, with each side attempting to attract other tribal groups to its banners. This political struggle continued even while Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin, was president. Even though Kalenjins emerged as new contenders in the graft game, divide and rule tribalism remained the basis for politics wherein Luo and Kikuyu leaders vied for prominence either inside Moi’s camp or in opposition to him.

During the last half of the last century as Kenya’s economy grew and its population expanded, there was more movement of people, especially Kikuyu tribesmen into Rift Valley Province in search of land at the expense of Masai and Kalenjin groups. Also, Kikuyus were becoming Kenya’s small traders and as such establishing themselves in cities, towns and villages throughout the country. As is true with Jews and Koreans in American ghettos, Kikuyu traders were resented by the local population that viewed them as exploitative. Such resentment was reinforced by national politics when patronage jobs, contracts, secondary and university school slots, etc. went to Kikuyus at the expense of other tribes. Consequently, Kikuyu economic success (humble as it might be) was seen as due to unfair factors. Thus, the ethnic pot boiled over onto both national and local fires.

Passions enflamed

Even though Luos and Kikuyus reluctantly joined forces to oust President Moi in 2002, the coalition between Kibaki and Odinga quickly dissolved, essentially because Kibaki reneged on the power sharing terms. It was back to winner take all, divide and rule. In 2007 the election was more clearly cast as tribal, Kikuyu and affiliates versus Luo and allies. Election issues of change, economic and social policies got subsumed into tribalism. It was time, Odinga supporters argued, to rotate the presidency; time to try to improve a system that was not performing. This theme struck a chord among voters who rallied to Raila’s banner. Entrenched Kikuyu interests in the presidency, in the administration, in the courts, in the military and in the private sector opposed dissolution of the status quo. So far, they have shown the power to prevail.

The outburst of violence in the wake of the stolen election has to be seen as the eruption of frustrations due to that egregious act; the arrogance of which underscored the stereotypical conviction of Kikuyu pride. The wave of anti-Kikuyu emotion expressed the pain of democracy usurped. Sadly, Kikuyu people became easy targets, blamed as a group for the actions of the Kibaki clique. Rioting also expresses itself in anti-government actions, challenges to the police and the disruption of civil order. As in any such mob scene, those engaged in violence while espousing political motives, quickly moved to acts of personal vengeance, destruction, looting and crime. Sadly, as elsewhere in Africa, Kenya has an abundance of unemployed bored young men who are willing participants in violence. Once they have the taste for this odd sort of adventure, it is difficult to restrain them. Now, it will be hard to avoid the emergence of rival tribal militias.

What can be done?

I fear the social fabric of Kenya has been irreparably torn. The clock cannot be turned back. Ethnic cleansing has occurred. Kikuyu have been driven out of some areas, Luos and Luhyas from others. Loss of relatives, friends, livelihoods, homes and opportunities will only entrench hatred in the hearts of victims. Slowly, of course, life will return to more peaceful patterns, but there will be a consolidation of tribal enclaves, greater separatism and sensitivity to tribal slights. Rioters will fade away and/or be beaten into submission by the police. A grievous price will have been paid, most perniciously in terms of people’s faith in each other, but also in terms of the economic system and in politics. The venom of tribalism will poison the society for years to come.

Both Kenyans and outside friends, including the U.S., seek modalities to defuse the immediate crisis. The first espoused option is to encourage the formation of a government of national unity including both Kibaki and Odinga. Essentially this asks the winner Odinga to be magnanimous in victory and to concede defeat to the man who cheated him out of his win. Second is to re-do the election. Neither looks especially promising. If there is no progress of this sort, donors and friends of Kenya will likely keep the government at arm’s length. This will have consequences in terms of bilateral relations, aid budgets and Kenya's prestige in the international community. Shunning Kenya will undoubtedly impact adversely on tourism. Kibaki’s team, however, is probably prepared to sit tight, weather the storm, grant a concession here or there, but otherwise to wield power as before. However, none of the possible resolutions or next moves can diminish the fact that tribalism is loose in the land and that Kenyans are worse off for it.

Kenya - The Struggle for Democracy

This is a book review of a new academic oriented collection of essays about Kenya's democractic prospects.

Kenya – The Struggle for Democracy

Godwin R. Murunga & Shadrack W. Nasong’o, editors

Zed Books, NY, 2007

Kenya – The Struggle for Democracy, still hot from the printer, is a compilation of scholarly essays about contemporary Kenya. The individual pieces are honest and blunt. Authors make no effort to hide prejudices that are aimed at colonialism, the Kenyatta and Moi regimes. Judgments on the Kibaki era are hedged, but various contributors fear it too is becoming engulfed in the same vortex of oligarchic power that has plagued Kenya for generations.

The editors state at the outset that contributors to the book are young academics not tainted by sell-out to the system. Further, the editors claim, young academics never benefited from mentoring that ought to have been their due from the previous generation (who did sell out). This is only the first of many themes of opportunities lost that run through the tome.

Readers be warned that Kenya – The Struggle for Democracy is an academic book replete with footnotes and citations of other learned works. Language too is quite erudite – often it seems deliberately so – sentences occasionally need several readings in order to make sense. Yet, there is a great deal of extremely good sense in this book.

The overall thrust of the book is to discuss in the Kenyan context the various elements that make up a democratic society. The basic charge against Kenya is that colonialism extended into Kenyattaism and Moism and even Kibakism without substantial change in the format of how government works, i.e. by coercion and intimidation. Although the leadership changed, authoritarian rule only became worse as Kenyatta and Moi expanded the powers of the presidency and then used those powers to assure their predominance. Yet against this backdrop, there was throughout an effort by many to push for democracy, popular participation and accountability. Topics covered in the book include the evolution of civil society organizations, the growth of religious movements and their political roles, the problems encountered by opposition political parties, the growth of youth movements and abuses of the same during multiparty elections, the stymied participation of women, missed opportunities by intellectuals, abuses perpetrated by the police, the impact of structural adjustment policies and the confusing roles of donors.

I judged the chapter on political parties to be among the most interesting, not only for its accurate history of the convoluted opposition to the Kenyatta and Moi regimes, but more on account of the analysis of why opposition did not function well and continues to operate poorly. The explanation that African polities do not accommodate a loyal opposition, i.e. you are either with me or an enemy, rings true in the Kenyan context, but is buttressed by the fact that no parties, expect perhaps KANU for a time, really have had any existence outside an electoral period. Beyond temporary coalitions designed solely to oust Moi, Kenya has no parties of issues –– only parties of “big men” who organize, pay for and selfishly direct “their” parties. This explains why Kenya has 55 registered parties, most of which are simply vehicles for personal ambitions. The author of this chapter argued that until political parties themselves become internally democratic they cannot become “democratic institutions” and realistically foment democracy.

The chapter on women explained convincingly how women were sidelined from national life during the last half century. The exclusion they experienced during colonial times arose mostly from the nature of their subsistence labor which kept them out of the “modern” sector and away from education. Such marginalization was augmented after independence when a perverted form of “traditional” patriarchy pushed them further into the corners of national life. Today Kenyan women account for only 6 percent of public figures; nearly last place in Africa. One solution might be an electoral system of proportional representation for Parliament. Countries with these systems, such as Rwanda (48 %), tend to have much higher proportions of women in public roles.

The discussion of intellectuals was a telling indictment by the author of his peers. He alleged that Kenyan intellectuals have not stood up to their responsibility to foster democracy. Several reasons for this lacuna are put forward: fear of reprisals,love of the good life, co-optation by the powers-that-be, failure of the older generation to give way to the new or simply shirking of duty. The introspection shown by this chapter demonstrates the guilt felt by many intellectuals for the failure of Kenya, both historically and currently, to achieve its democratic potential.

The chapter on the police provided details on how the police and security services evolved under Kenyatta and Moi to become the essential bulwark of presidential power. Instances of assassination, torture, and other egregious abuses of authority are cited as well as the erosion of the rule of law and the compromise of the judiciary. It is a troubling read, but necessary to understand the fear and intimidation that permeated political society and kept the opposition in check. The author hopes that under Kibaki abuses are being corrected, but gives little evidence that the system has undergone fundamental reform.

Finally, the book concludes with two chapters that link Kenya’s political troubles and tensions of the last half century to its economic woes. There were certainly causal links as bad decisions (both political and economic) and bad luck (mostly economic) led to a spiral of decline. The poor internal Kenyan economic dynamic was further destabilized by changing and contradictory policies imposed by the World Bank, IMF and donor nations. Although there is an effort to level blame for economic failures, there is more of an explanation of what happened and an appeal for consistency in the future.

Kenya – The Struggle for Democracy, is full of current information and realistic history. For those ready for a graduate-school level tome, it is a useful guide to crucial Kenyan issues.