Review and Critique of Slow Poison – Idi Amin, Yoweri
Museveni and the making of the Ugandan State, by Mahmood Mamdani, Belknap
Press, Cambridge, 2025.
Mamdani lays initial blame for
Uganda’s ills on British colonialism which established an authoritarian
social/economic system that divided people into categories by race, religion, nationality,
place of birth, tribe, and geography. He
credits Idi Amin with upsetting that system by rejecting Britian and expelling Asians
(like Mamdani’s family) to usher in an era of black African empowerment. Mamdani acknowledges Amin’s eccentricities
and brutality, but nonetheless credits him with transforming the nation, and
placing it on grounds where citizens, i.e. black Africans, were more equal
before the law. Overall, the thrust of
Mamdani’s observations about Amin provides a more positive perspective on
his rule.
The author dwells extensively (and
not unexpectedly) on the expulsion of Asians. He discusses citizenship and
enfranchisement at length throughout the book. He opines that if Asian property
had been transferred to astute Baganda businessmen rather than illiterate army
thugs, the economy would not have crashed so badly.
Turning to Museveni, Amin initially
saw him as the embodiment of a newer era of politics based on widespread
democratic participation. That hope,
however, was not to be realized as Museveni was stymied by the reality of
consolidating power and the need to improve Uganda’s standing with the
international community. Museveni
succumbed to the “Washington Consensus,” that is, the necessity to implement
stringent economic measures in order to become eligible for IMF/IBRD and other
western aid. Such measures began a
spiral of consequences, which coupled with ongoing conflict in Uganda’s north
led Museveni to resort to colonial type divisions to retain control. Thus, he reinstituted and expanded upon
internal tribal and ethnic divisions. Museveni waged unrelenting war against
northerners, more for political than military objectives. As time went by, corruption
increased dramatically. Army and political figures engaged in fraud and
deception. Museveni cleverly distracted foreign criticism of human rights
abuses and internal deficiencies by engaging openly in the regional war on
terror by providing troops for operations in Somalia and Sudan. This persuaded the United States and other
powers to back away from confrontation on internal Ugandan issues.
The most interesting (and coherent)
part of the book is the summary conclusion chapter. It condenses all that went
before into an understandable essay. Mamdani concludes that Uganda is a mess. He
professes that broad based accountable democracy might turn the tide but offers
little hope that will happen in the near future.
Critique
I thought the book jumped around
too much. Ostensibly a chronicle,
Mamdani interjected anecdotes that jumped forward or backward in time. It was
hard to keep track of where you were in the sequence of events.
I spotted several errors of fact,
several misspellings and misuse of words. None of which ought to occur in a scholarly
book published by a reputable press.
That I, not a Ugandan specialist, could spot such mistakes, leads me to
ask what other errors exist in the history that I did not discern.
To wit: In chapter ten, Mamdani
reports that in the1980s he conferred with Joseph Kabila on the terrace of the
Imperial Hotel in Kampala. Joseph Kabila was only a child then. Mamdani met his
father Laurent Kabila. Later the author notes that in 1986 he flew to
Rwanda. Obviously, judging from the
statement of being met by James Kabarebe, a prominent Rwandan army figure in
the Tutsi regime that took power after the 1994 genocide, the date should be
1996. There are other mistakes regarding Rwanda; in chapter twelve, Fred Rwigyema’s
name is misspelled and Paul Kagame, later (and current) president of Rwanda, is
given the incorrect first name of Alex. In the same chapter Laurent Kabila is
again called Joseph. Perhaps intentionally to offset the ousting of “Joseph”
Mobutu in 1997. While it is correct that
Mobutu’s baptismal name was Joseph Desiré
he had gone by Mobutu Sese Seko for the preceding 25 years. I note that in his conclusion chapter, Mamdani
got the Rwandan and Congolese names correct. Perhaps the most egregious error, however, is in
chapter 13 calling the Lord’s Resistance Army, the Lord’s Redemption Army. Joseph Kony’s cult is well documented as the
Lord’s Resistance Army.
Nitpicks
In chapter 13, South Sudan in 2005 is referred to as ‘independent.’ ‘Autonomous’ would be appropriate. Independence did not come until 2011. In the final chapter when describing the population of Luwero “consisting of Baganda and Banyarwanda (both ethnically Bantu), as well as other northerners.” Surely Mamdani means “southerners.”
Recommendation
All in all, I enjoyed the book. It fills gaps in the history of Uganda and provides a good perspective on what happened. The “I was there” factor adds to the veracity of the story, although the digressions into political philosophy of who was thinking what at the time in the intellectual community, clouds the history. Mamdani names names, which again – when he gets them right – adds credibility to his memories. Ugandans, students and observers of Africa will find this an interesting book.
Additional Comment:
As I write in January 2026.
Museveni has just been elected to another term as president.
Intrigued by Mamdani’s assessments
of Amin and Museveni, I took the opportunity to review various U.S. government
officials’ assessments of the two. I
read oral history transcripts on the www.adst.org site. Essentially the
histories, mine included, are reflections of places, events, people and issues
that Foreign Service personnel encountered during their careers.
Amin was characterized, especially
by Ambassador Tom Melady and DCM/chargé
Bob Keeley as the bloody tyrant that he was. They give particulars. They found him
difficult to deal with and a terrible, capricious manager of government. Ultimately the U.S. decision to evacuate the
embassy in 1973 was predicated on Amin’s unpredictability and threats against
Americans. These two interlocutors with
Amin would give him no credit – as Mamdani does – for improving Uganda.
Museveni is more of a mixed bag. Those
of us who knew him earlier in his career found him articulate, engaging, and
open to ideas and discussion. He was always
self-deprecating and had a wry sense of humor. His economic/social vision for Uganda was
practical and being implemented. Contrary to Mamdani, we Americans felt that
conformity to global financial standards and requirements was the best way
forward for Uganda. Throughout Americans
questioned Museveni’s devotion to non-political party democracy, but at least initially
it worked. Besides my recollection, I
recommend Mike Southwick, who was ambassador from 1994 to 1997, and Steve
Browning who served from 2006 to 2009. Browning found Museveni, after more than
twenty years in power, to be more imperial and less prone to listening to or
following advice from the outside. That
characteristic has only gotten worse in the last 16 years.
Although a great number of Foreign
Service personnel have recorded their career histories with ADST, many have
not. I was disappointed to find that after the mid-nineties, only Southwick and
Browning registered memories of Uganda. I would have liked more. Concomitantly,
I note that of my eight successors as ambassador to Rwanda, only one, Mike
Arietti, has done a history. Again, I would love to know what others’
impressions of people and places were.
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