Conflict and Terrorism in Africa
Prepared for Angelo State
University, February 2013
Robert E. Gribbin
Americans often think of
Africa as a locus of violence. A place
where conflict and warfare are common; where strange politics brings barbarous
men like Idi Amin, Jean Bedel Bokassa and Charles Taylor to power; where
atrocities like starvation, rape and genocide are all too common as is the
plunder of villages and the theft of resources. More recently Africa has also been the site of
international terrorism – specifically the killings of American diplomatic
personnel in Libya and the occupation of northern Mali. Unfortunately the stereotypes of violence in
Africa are true or at least were true for parts of Africa. In this talk I propose to look at the nature
of conflicts and terrorism to see if we can better understand and find ways to
deal with them.
First, I believe it import to
know that conflict occurs over something.
The something might be land for grazing or agricultural rights; another
might be people – slavery engendered lots of conflict; a third, religion –
Nigerians, for example, still engage in religious based fighting between
Christians and Moslems and of course international terrorism has its roots in
Islamic fundamentalism; a fourth, ideology – war in the Congo, Angola and
Ethiopia all contained cold war rationales. and a fifth, the liberation wars
for southern Africa were fought in
opposition to the ideology of white rule. Whatever the accompanying reasons,
basically conflict comes down to power – challengers seeking to control the
government and its resources and defenders seeking to preserve dominance.
A second factor that is
always in play in Africa is that of identity.
Although it has become politically incorrect to speak of tribalism,
ethnic identity is precisely the factor involved. Anthropologists define a tribe as a group with
a common language, culture and myths of origin. Tribal identity is integral to individual
identity. When I was a Peace Corps Volunteer in Kenya, for example, and
employing young men for a water project; their letters seeking employment would
begin “Dear Sir, my name is James, I am Luo”
or “I am Nandi by tribe.” In modern Africa adherence to the larger
tribal family provides a ready network for education, places to stay in the
cities and jobs. Those who have
succeeded in life are inclined to look after their brothers first. It is
expected of them and they expect to do it. In the post independence years after
1960 tribalism flourished as the building block of politics wherein each tribal
group contested for power and the spoils of government. This remains true today. African states are
artificially constructed geographical entities and as such have forced tribes
together that prior to the modern era by and large maintained their own systems
of government, society and economy. It
is not surprising that tribal contesting for the control of government is the
hallmark of African politics.
The African nations that have
avoided being swept up in tribal based jockeying and conflict, either have one
numerically overwhelming tribe in charge like Botswana or have too many tribes
like Tanzania so that no single group can hope to prevail. I have to footnote here that there are always
exceptions. Somalia has but one tribe, the Somali, yet it has been riven by
internal factions based on clans. Rwanda’s terrible genocide in 1994 that left
about one million dead was based not on tribal differences, but on ethnic
differences between Hutu and Tutsi, both ethnicities fall within the broader
tribe of Kinyarwanda speaking people.
However, the basis for conflict both in Somalia and in Rwanda was the
quest for power.
In addition to the indigenous
social pressures of tribalism, conflict in Africa has been historically
exacerbated by other factors. First,
let’s go way back to slavery. Even though prior to the Atlantic slave trade
slavery existed on the continent, it was a local phenomena. However, the opening of the New World market beginning
with the Portuguese in the 16th century and continuing on into the
19th century played havoc
with peaceful society. Slavers ushered in an era of suspicion and violence that
undoubtedly infected attitudes for generations that followed. Neighbors could not trust neighbors. The colonialism that came afterward was
exploitation of people and resources by European powers. Tribes were lumped together without
considerations for differences and order was maintained by firepower. Unfortunately, the system of colonial rule –
that is an arbitrary system controlled through a rigid hierarchical structure for
the benefit of European overlords was replicated in newly independent
governments. The tribe that was well
placed to take over at independence did so to the detriment of others. Even as they kept the strict autocratic
colonial administrative system in place, new African governments justified
their one man one party rule as being grounded in the traditional African value
of consensus. Everyone had to go
along. No opposition was permitted.
Political change came via
death of the leader, an occurrence that frequently happened as part of a
military take-over. This was the usual
method of succession for many years. It
engendered understandable paranoia in presidents. They needed protection for
their regime, so they wanted a competent security apparatus, yet frequently it
was the head of the military who ousted them, so leaders did not want the
military to be too competent.
The Biafran civil war in
Nigeria in 1968 was Africa’s most hotly contested issue of secession. In short
the Igbo people of the south sought to secede from the larger entity of
Nigeria. The horrors of that war were well publicized and certainly gave
substance to the perception that Africa was a violent, dangerous place. Yet
resolution of the conflict via unconditional surrender of Biafra reaffirmed the
continent wide tenet that no changes to colonial delimited borders would be
tolerated. This basic premise, with
exceptions for Eritrea and South Sudan, has stymied secessionist movements
elsewhere on the continent.
The cold war was in full roar
when Africa became independent. The west, the east and China choose sides. The impact of the cold war on what might have
otherwise been manageable internal conflicts was to magnify them especially by
the provision of vast amounts of weaponry.
Thus, struggles in Congo, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Namibia were
intensified and prolonged by cold war factors. Additionally, the over lapping liberation
struggles in southern Africa including Zimbabwe and South Africa, with the
added elements of combating white rule contributed to an era of widespread
conflict.
Success
In the last decade we have
actually seen a remarkable amount of progress in reducing the level of conflict
in Africa. I think this is due to
several factors:
With the end of the cold war
the amount of weaponry available and the cross border support that
characterized those wars ceased. The end of the cold war also meant that
western nations, including the U.S. no longer had reasons to prop up autocratic
rulers like Mobutu in Zaire or Doe in Liberia and to ignore their corruption
and human rights abuses.
The liberation of southern
Africa and the end of apartheid in South Africa, zeroed out race based
conflict.
The wave of multi-party
constitutions that swept across Africa in the 1990s changed the nature of
contesting for political power throughout the continent. Today there is much
less of a winner take all syndrome and a better understanding of accountability.
Whenever peaceful change occurs
successfully the prospects for its repeating increase.
Better political systems,
clearly improved economics, more open communications and the rise of a middle
class all tend to favor continuity and progress over conflict.
Better militaries. Remember
as I indicated above that African militaries have as their first responsibility
protection of the regime. The number of
real out-and-out wars between African states are few – Tanzania/Uganda,
Ethiopia/Eritrea, Somalia/Ethiopia and the second Congolese war are the only
ones that come to mind. Thus African
states find it difficult to justify large military establishments. But for what they do have, donor states
including the U.S. have been willing to help “professionalize”. This indeed has worked to some extent as it
has resulted in better leadership, planning, financing and accountability. A
better local military means that an insurgent group is less likely to challenge
it. Although impossible to measure we
believe this sort of professionalization also helps keep the military out of
politics. Again, however, a footnote:
Captain Sanogo who led the coup in Mali last year was U.S. trained.
The world, including
certainly African leaders, has put into place and has employed much improved
mechanisms for resolving disputes and thus ending or mitigating conflict. Generally this involves mediation between
contesting parties under the aegis of senior statesmen. Examples of successful negotiations include:
the Lusaka Accords for Congo, Arusha Accords for Burundi, the Liberian
Constitution hammered out in Accra, Nairobi discussions on Somalia, talks for
the Cote d’Ivoire and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan. Again a footnote: the Arusha Agreements for
Rwanda in 1993 did not work and probably hastened the onset of genocide. Why?
Because the hard liners that later instigated the genocide were not part of the
process. The lesson learned was that all parties to conflict had to be at the
mediation table.
As with negotiations, over
the years we have learned lessons from peace keeping operations in Africa. For
example, troops today are better equipped, trained and have clear mandates. Additionally,
Africans are out in front. Formerly in
Liberia and Sierra Leone, now in Somalia and CAR and soon in Mali, Africans
take the lead in running Peace Keeping Operations. African troops are likewise
essential to UN Peace Keeping efforts in Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia and
Eritrea.
Cool Spots
Before I get to the hot
spots, let me briefly review the successes of the last ten years or so. These
nations are pretty much out of the woods in terms of slipping back into anarchy
and violence.
Liberia – Although personally
an optimist, when I was in Liberia in 2003 while megalomaniac Charles Taylor
ran the place I had no hope for the nation.
But that has all completely changed. Liberia is well started on the road
back under dynamic democratically elected president, Ellen Sirleaf Johnson.
Neighboring Sierra Leone too
is stable and progressing.
Rwanda has recovered
remarkably from the impact of genocide. It has visionary leadership under
President Paul Kagame who is striving to complement Rwanda’s agricultural
riches with a high tech industrial sector. Rwanda has now judged those guilty
of genocide and is attempting to move ahead into a society where ethnicity is
not a factor.
Burundi’s civil war ended in
2005 with the inauguration of Pierre Nkurazizi and the implementation of an
ethnically inclusive political system.
After much maneuvering and
years of strife Cote d’Ivoire too has cobbled together a political compromise
that provides for stability. Its economic leadership in West Africa may also
recover as the benefits of peace are re-established.
Now for the hot spots.
Let’s take Mali first since it
is so much in the news and look at three issues. First the descent of Mali into
the current maelstrom began with the military take over last year by Captain Sanogo
and his team. Part of the dispute that
led to this was a disagreement over the government’s role in the north. Whatever the basis for the action, the
takeover indicated that Mali’s democracy was fragile. It was corrupt and
unresponsive and simply did not stand up to the coup makers. So one item to be fixed in Mali is the
restoration of healthy democratic government.
Even though the coup leaders have ceded some authority to an appointed
civilian government, the key issue here – at least for the U.S. – is the
seating of an elected government. As a
point of law, the U.S. ceases bilateral assistance whenever a legally
constituted government is illegally overthrown. Plans are underway for elections next summer.
A second issue in Mali is the
exclusion of the Tuareg people of the Sahara from government. This is the tribal issue at play. Tuaregs have been in rebellion in some
fashion or another since colonial times. Current difficulties began when
leaders took advantage of the coup in Bamako to assert their independence in
the north. They dubbed their breakaway nation Azwad. Some of the Tuaregs gained
the weaponry needed to substantiate their break from having served in Qadafi’s
military. When he fell, they came home with the guns.
The third part of the problem
lies with terrorists. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is a successor
organization to a Salafist group from southern Algeria. Over the years its
grievances have essentially been aimed at Algeria, even as its actions centered
on smuggling and kidnapping for ransom.
At some point AQIM was acknowledged to be a “franchise” of AL Qaeda but
analysts differ on how close contacts might be.
In any case in addition to Algerians, AQIM boasts fighters and adherents
from Mali and several surrounding African states as well as from the Middle
East. Another outfit identified as Ansar
Dine, which appears to be Libyan oriented also joined in. In sum, these organizations, composed mostly
of outsiders, coopted and took over the Tuareg secessionist movement. Their
vision is one of Islamic extremism. One of anti-western jihad with careful
adherence to the Koran and implementation of Sharia law. This is a much more rigid
interpretation of Islam than the Tuaregs or other residents of the north
practice.
The French led intervention has restored
Malian control to most of the north. The
towns of Gao and Timbuktu are back in government hands. I am confident that the French will stay
involved to assure military success even after an African force is in
place. The terrorists have been chased
back into the desert where small groups of them may remain active for some
time.
The key to pacification of
the north is some sort of viable agreement between the central government and
the Tuaregs. Let it be said that Bamako governments have historically not been
willing to make the concessions necessary for resolution. We’ll have to see if a new government is more
accommodating. Absent that you’ll have a military occupation and political
stalemate that might endure for years to come.
Sudan
Although Mali appears to be a
solvable problem, Sudan may not be.
There are two conflicts outstanding in Sudan – one in Darfur and the
other between Sudan and South Sudan.
First, Darfur. Conflict
in Darfur is a mélange of tribalism, regionalism, desertification, secessionist
sentiment, Khartoum politics and opportunism. Essentially in the early 2000s Darfur
saw the South getting an acceptable deal – including oil - from Khartoum. It
too wanted autonomy and reversion to the independence it enjoyed in the 19th
century. Additionally, African tribes
correctly felt that Khartoum favored Arab tribes whenever issues - such as disputes over land or grazing rights arose. Droughts in the eighties and nineties
exacerbated such tensions. So Darfur
rebelled. Khartoum’s response was
harsh. It unleashed the superior
firepower of the air force and the army.
It authorized and equipped Arab militia units to terrorize, destroy and
loot. The international community
characterized this violence as genocide. Over a million people fled to internal
camps and across the border to Chad. Throughout
the central government denied any involvement in any atrocities, but it
adamantly refused to let the humanitarian community care for victims. The worst of the violence was in 2003 and
2004. The conflict has since settled into a standoff. There has been no
resolution and efforts to negotiate a settlement have gone nowhere, but a UN
peacekeeping presence has lessened the number of violent incidents and, as grudgingly
permitted, humanitarian assistance has helped the afflicted. I do not see anything new happening in Darfur
until there is regime change in Khartoum and a willingness on the central
government’s part to accommodate some autonomy for Darfur.
Southern issues are more
intractable and inflammable. The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in 2005 was a successful effort that ended
40 years of civil war; a war that in simplistic terms pitted black African
Christian or animist southerners against Arab Muslim northerners. The key
provision was that in six years the South would hold a plebiscite on whether to
remain with Sudan or not. Since in the
interim period neither side did much to encourage unity, it was not surprising
that the South voted for independence. Thus in 2011 South Sudan was born. Despite the term comprehensive, the agreement
punted on several difficult issues. They
included oil revenue, the status of Abyei, the oil producing area, and the future
of southerners in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile provinces, areas that were
left under northern sovereignty.
Eighty percent of oil production
occurs in the south, but the pipe lines to export it transit the north. Oil revenues were a major source of financing
for the government in Khartoum – especially for its war efforts - and, after independence, virtually the sole
source of revenue for the new government in Juba. During the interim period prior to the plebiscite
the parties could not agree on a formula for dividing revenues. Additionally, even though the CPA ordained a
separate referendum to decide the status of Abyei, the parties have been unable
to agree on the terms for that process. So last year, as tensions heightened
and the two nations approached the brink of renewed war, the South declared a
moratorium on oil exports. This had an
obviously catastrophic effect on southern revenues, but underlined how
determined the new government was to assert its sovereignty and to use the
money lever to extract a workable formula and better behavior from the regime
in Khartoum. So far, it has not worked.
Without further definition the
CPA stated that suitable arrangements would have to be decided vis a vis ethnic
southerners and sympathizers in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. Black Africans in
those areas, especially the Juba Mountains, were part and parcel of the
Southern Peoples Liberation Movement for which they fought and died, but they
were not included in the new state.
Afterwards as they continued to agitate against Khartoum, they were
subjected to brutal and indiscriminate suppression, essentially a policy of
annihilation.
Intervention by African
presidents last year in compelling talks between presidents Bashir and Kir have
avoided open warfare between the two states, yet despite a UN Peace Keeping
Presence, meddling by each side across the border and conflict along the border
continues apace.
Although the money issue will
ultimately force the parties to some workable agreement – oil production may
resume in several months – other issues are stalemated. As with Darfur, if any real progress is to be
made it will probably come after a regime change in Khartoum.
Meanwhile, the international
community having helped create a failed state in South Sudan must shoulder some
enormous responsibilities in fostering progress.
Congo.
The current imbroglio in the
Congo has many roots, but conflict there is clearly tied to power. Power over
the land, the people and the resources. Parties
to violence have exploited tribalism, local, national and regional
politics. Outside powers have
intervened, ostensibly to protect their national security interests. Various negotiation efforts produced sparse
results. The result has been a region in anarchy. Estimates are that up to five
million people have perished during the past twenty years – some directly from warfare,
most from the collapse of social infrastructure – markets, agriculture, roads,
heath services, schools, food and medicine distribution systems and so forth. A
million people are displaced and the economy has suffered grievously.
Dissecting the ins and outs
of the chaos is complicated. I’ll give
a thumb nail sketch. In the last decade
or so of Mobutu’s Zaire, central government control of eastern Zaire slipped
away. So when the Rwandan genocide
occurred in 1994 the lands across the border were lightly regulated. The influx of a million Hutu refugees who
remained under the control of those who organized genocide augmented existing
tribal hatreds. Shortly, the new Rwanda
leadership allying with Tutsi citizens of Zaire and under cover of a Zairian organization
compelled the return of most refugees from the border camps. However,
genocidaire forces accompanied by several tens of thousands of refugees fled
westward into the jungle. Ultimately
fighting led to Mobutu’s departure and Laurent Kabila’s installation as chief
of state. Several years later, Kabila in
turn betrayed his sponsors and that led to a second Congolese war. That war ended when in accordance with the
provisions of the Lusaka Accords foreign forces withdrew, a UN Peace Keeping
operation began and internal dialogue ensued leading finally to the
establishment of a legitimate government in Kinshasa, now headed by Joseph
Kabila. Yet the anarchy in the east
continued. Rwandan and Ugandan
surrogates battled each other. Genocidaire forces, local militia and warlords
ran amok. Tribal and ethnic issues became even more contentious. The UN
operation proved inadequate. Political
solutions did not stick. External actors – mostly Rwandan and Ugandan –
plundered natural resources. Iterations
of violence continued.
The central government has
not proven able to control the east. Its reconstituted several times military
forces remain as much a problem as they are a solution. The UN PKO, the largest in the world, remains
marginally effective. In the round of
violence beginning last year a Tutsi militia group called M23 renewed
independent operations claiming that the March 23rd agreement of 2009
that should have included them in the Congolese army had not been honored. Subsequently, presidents of Congo, Rwanda and
Uganda hammered out yet another deal designed to calm the east.
I think we have been on the
right track towards solutions for some time.
Key is to hold governments and organizations to their commitments.
External meddling is not helpful, but the fecklessness of Kinshasa’s approach
to the east is also counterproductive.
More widespread peace is clearly the principal requirement for progress.
Somalia
I have to talk about Somalia
in any discussion of conflict in Africa.
I won’t do a blow by blow, but will observe that the situation there
after decades of conflict has improved.
This is due to several factors: years of political discussions and
maneuvering – mostly among Somali leaders themselves - finally led to a process and establishment of
a legitimate government. Thanks to an
African Union military intervention force dubbed AMISOM, that new government
has the space to operate and consolidate its authority. Much remains to be accomplished. International terrorist linked forces of Al Shabaab
while now in retreat are nonetheless formidable adversaries. The U.S. keeps a careful eye out for them and
has acted unilaterally on several occasions to impede them. Outsiders including the US and African
contributors to AMISOM will have a role to play in promoting pacification in
Somalia for years to come.
Terrorism
Let me close with a few
observations about terrorism. Although
acts of terrorism can and have been employed by disgruntled elements for years,
we are most concerned today with terrorists who link their cause to an Islamic
fundamentalist jihad aimed at the west, aimed at America. Blowing up U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar
es Salaam, bombing the USS Cole and of course the 9/11 attacks are examples of
their work. Defeating such terrorists
requires intelligence about them and their plans as well as the ability to
interdict and defeat them.
African states share our
abhorrence with international terrorism and within their means are supportive
of efforts to deny it footholds, root it out and destroy it. With the
exceptions of when Sudan hosted terrorists, including Ben Laiden, in the early
nineties, and the ungoverned spaces of Somalia and Mali, African governments
deny sanctuary to terrorists. Terrorists have to operate clandestinely.
U.S. policy is to encourage
and support African efforts to more robustly combat international terrorism. To
this end we cooperate on intelligence matters and on the military side we train
and equip African units for interdiction operations. Much of the justification for U.S.
involvement in Somalia, the presence of our military task force in the horn of
Africa based in Djibouti and certainly our support to operations in Mali and
elsewhere in the Sahara are based on anti-terrorist criteria.
From a policy perspective of
an ambassador I think the necessity here is to be cautious and to strike a
proper balance. We must not let
anti-terrorism considerations become the sole wherewithal for American
relations with African nations.
Let me conclude by
reiterating that the trends regarding conflict in Africa are encouraging. Today there are fewer volatile situations and
better mechanisms for avoiding violence than was true in the past. But until African political systems are fully
resilient and mature, disgruntlement can easily morph into violence. Meanwhile hot spots – especially Sudan, Congo
and Somalia - will remain combustible and others may flare up. Finally, terrorists will continue to probe
for targets of opportunity.
So while, the overall
situation is much improved, vigilance and action are still necessary. In that regard the United States will remain
a viable partner in helping to quell conflict and squash terrorism.
Well I have said a lot. Let
me stop here and listen to your comments and questions.
Thank you.
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