Following is a review of Prelude to Genocide - Arusha, Rwanda, and the Failure of Diplomacy by David Rawson, Ohio University Press, Athens, 2018.
Prelude to Genocide is the most detailed and best documented account of
a diplomatic negotiation that I know of.
Its authoritativeness and accuracy cannot be questioned. The effort that
went into culling through the files and then affixing the proper
citations is astounding. The story unfolds in a
chronological fashion although it jumps backward at times to repeat some common
background for a new thread. The book
flows fairly well. Its best features are the comprehensiveness of the study and
its worst the fact that it is an academic treatise that is not likely to
entertain folks who are not deeply interested in either the Rwandan crisis or
the process of negotiations.
This book is not going to reach a popular audience, but
for those focused on Rwanda or on what constitutes a negotiation and how that
occurs, the book is illustrative. In
that regard, anyone who wonders what diplomats actually do will not help but be
impressed with the enormous amount of to and fro and give and take that ensues
as foreign policy is pushed along. The book has definite text possibilities for
classes on diplomacy, negotiation or conflict resolution. The latter because the author notes
throughout what was not working and what the ultimate result of such failures
would be.
Some readers are going to try
to mine this book for smoking guns, i.e. proof that the U.S. knew genocide was
coming, or complicity in that regard by the failure to act. Rawson is up front
on what the U.S. knew about deteriorating security and when, as well as
Rwanda’s historical predilection towards ethnic violence. He is similarly candid when talking about the
policy frameworks that governed U.S. actions.
Certainly diplomats were hamstrung from not having all possible options
available, but given the parameters within which they had to work, this book
provides an accurate record of what transpired.
Since none of the Rwandans involved in the talks has or will
write about their motives and expectations, this book must stand as
definitive. Kigali side players are dead
and RPF players that remain are too cautious to be frank and too blinded by
hindsight to be accurate. Internal records on the part of participants -
whatever might have existed - are probably long gone.