Amin, Museveni and the fate of Uganda

 

Review and Critique of Slow Poison – Idi Amin, Yoweri Museveni and the making of the Ugandan State, by Mahmood Mamdani, Belknap Press, Cambridge, 2025.

             This opus is an insider’s look at Uganda that will appeal to insiders knowledgeable about Uganda. It is an academic treatise so can be complicated. Essentially the author Professor Mahmood Mamdani, a Ugandan of Asian ethnicity, tells the story of Uganda’s evolution from independence forward. He mixes history, his opinions of what happened and why alongside a recitation of his personal involvement in issues of the day.

Mamdani lays initial blame for Uganda’s ills on British colonialism which established an authoritarian social/economic system that divided people into categories by race, religion, nationality, place of birth, tribe, and geography.  He credits Idi Amin with upsetting that system by rejecting Britian and expelling Asians (like Mamdani’s family) to usher in an era of black African empowerment.  Mamdani acknowledges Amin’s eccentricities and brutality, but nonetheless credits him with transforming the nation, and placing it on grounds where citizens, i.e. black Africans, were more equal before the law.  Overall, the thrust of Mamdani’s observations about Amin provides a more positive perspective on his rule.

The author dwells extensively (and not unexpectedly) on the expulsion of Asians. He discusses citizenship and enfranchisement at length throughout the book. He opines that if Asian property had been transferred to astute Baganda businessmen rather than illiterate army thugs, the economy would not have crashed so badly.   

Turning to Museveni, Amin initially saw him as the embodiment of a newer era of politics based on widespread democratic participation.  That hope, however, was not to be realized as Museveni was stymied by the reality of consolidating power and the need to improve Uganda’s standing with the international community.  Museveni succumbed to the “Washington Consensus,” that is, the necessity to implement stringent economic measures in order to become eligible for IMF/IBRD and other western aid.  Such measures began a spiral of consequences, which coupled with ongoing conflict in Uganda’s north led Museveni to resort to colonial type divisions to retain control.   Thus, he reinstituted and expanded upon internal tribal and ethnic divisions. Museveni waged unrelenting war against northerners, more for political than military objectives. As time went by, corruption increased dramatically. Army and political figures engaged in fraud and deception. Museveni cleverly distracted foreign criticism of human rights abuses and internal deficiencies by engaging openly in the regional war on terror by providing troops for operations in Somalia and Sudan.  This persuaded the United States and other powers to back away from confrontation on internal Ugandan issues.

The most interesting (and coherent) part of the book is the summary conclusion chapter. It condenses all that went before into an understandable essay.  Mamdani concludes that Uganda is a mess. He professes that broad based accountable democracy might turn the tide but offers little hope that will happen in the near future.

Critique

I thought the book jumped around too much.  Ostensibly a chronicle, Mamdani interjected anecdotes that jumped forward or backward in time. It was hard to keep track of where you were in the sequence of events.  

I spotted several errors of fact, several misspellings and misuse of words.  None of which ought to occur in a scholarly book published by a reputable press.  That I, not a Ugandan specialist, could spot such mistakes, leads me to ask what other errors exist in the history that I did not discern.

To wit: In chapter ten, Mamdani reports that in the1980s he conferred with Joseph Kabila on the terrace of the Imperial Hotel in Kampala. Joseph Kabila was only a child then. Mamdani met his father Laurent Kabila. Later the author notes that in 1986 he flew to Rwanda.  Obviously, judging from the statement of being met by James Kabarebe, a prominent Rwandan army figure in the Tutsi regime that took power after the 1994 genocide, the date should be 1996. There are other mistakes regarding Rwanda; in chapter twelve, Fred Rwigyema’s name is misspelled and Paul Kagame, later (and current) president of Rwanda, is given the incorrect first name of Alex. In the same chapter Laurent Kabila is again called Joseph. Perhaps intentionally to offset the ousting of “Joseph” Mobutu in 1997.  While it is correct that Mobutu’s baptismal name was Joseph Desiré he had gone by Mobutu Sese Seko for the preceding 25 years.  I note that in his conclusion chapter, Mamdani got the Rwandan and Congolese names correct.  Perhaps the most egregious error, however, is in chapter 13 calling the Lord’s Resistance Army, the Lord’s Redemption Army.   Joseph Kony’s cult is well documented as the Lord’s Resistance Army. 

Nitpicks

In chapter 13, South Sudan in 2005 is referred to as ‘independent.’  ‘Autonomous’ would be appropriate.  Independence did not come until 2011.  In the final chapter when describing the population of Luwero “consisting of Baganda and Banyarwanda (both ethnically Bantu), as well as other northerners.”  Surely Mamdani means “southerners.” 

Recommendation

All in all, I enjoyed the book. It fills gaps in the history of Uganda and provides a good perspective on what happened. The “I was there” factor adds to the veracity of the story, although the digressions into political philosophy of who was thinking what at the time in the intellectual community, clouds the history. Mamdani names names, which again – when he gets them right – adds credibility to his memories.  Ugandans, students and observers of Africa will find this an interesting book.

Additional Comment:

As I write in January 2026. Museveni has just been elected to another term as president.

Intrigued by Mamdani’s assessments of Amin and Museveni, I took the opportunity to review various U.S. government officials’ assessments of the two.  I read oral history transcripts on the www.adst.org site. Essentially the histories, mine included, are reflections of places, events, people and issues that Foreign Service personnel encountered during their careers.

Amin was characterized, especially by Ambassador Tom Melady and DCM/chargé Bob Keeley as the bloody tyrant that he was. They give particulars. They found him difficult to deal with and a terrible, capricious manager of government.  Ultimately the U.S. decision to evacuate the embassy in 1973 was predicated on Amin’s unpredictability and threats against Americans.  These two interlocutors with Amin would give him no credit – as Mamdani does – for improving Uganda.

Museveni is more of a mixed bag. Those of us who knew him earlier in his career found him articulate, engaging, and open to ideas and discussion.  He was always self-deprecating and had a wry sense of humor.  His economic/social vision for Uganda was practical and being implemented. Contrary to Mamdani, we Americans felt that conformity to global financial standards and requirements was the best way forward for Uganda.  Throughout Americans questioned Museveni’s devotion to non-political party democracy, but at least initially it worked.  Besides my recollection, I recommend Mike Southwick, who was ambassador from 1994 to 1997, and Steve Browning who served from 2006 to 2009. Browning found Museveni, after more than twenty years in power, to be more imperial and less prone to listening to or following advice from the outside.  That characteristic has only gotten worse in the last 16 years.

Although a great number of Foreign Service personnel have recorded their career histories with ADST, many have not. I was disappointed to find that after the mid-nineties, only Southwick and Browning registered memories of Uganda. I would have liked more. Concomitantly, I note that of my eight successors as ambassador to Rwanda, only one, Mike Arietti, has done a history. Again, I would love to know what others’ impressions of people and places were.